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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the psychological underpinning of the consumer aversion to 
genetically modified foods. Although a substantial body of scientific evidence supports the 
notion that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are safe to consume, many consumers 
continue to reject these products on principle. Drawing on research that distinguishes how people 
reason about natural and manmade objects, I find that consumers are more accepting of GMOs 
when marketing cues suggest they are manmade. Evidence from these studies suggests that the 
moral opposition towards genetically modified foods impedes the perception of their benefits. 
Critically, this moral opposition is reduced when the product is positioned as being manmade. 
Specifically, if consumers view the GMO as manmade and if they understand why it was 
created, moral opposition towards the product diminishes, and the GMO’s perceived benefits 
increase, which subsequently increases purchase intentions for the product.  
As a whole, this work offers novel theoretical insights into consumers’ negative response 
to GM foods. Although prior research suggests that consumers dislike GMOs because these 
products are unnatural, the present work demonstrates that preference for a GMO is actually 
contingent upon the belief that the object ought to be natural. When cues suggest that the product 
is manmade to begin with, consumers are more accepting of genetically modified foods. This 
research also represents the first evidence that moral opposition impedes the perception of a GM 
food’s benefits. Finally, this work lends managerial implications in light of the recent GMO food 
labelling debate.  
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Chapter 1 
1   Introduction 
Food preference has long been of great interest to marketers (Roberts and Wortzel 1979; 
Talukdar and Lindsey 2013; Tracey 1949) and in particular, food preference as it relates to 
public awareness and consumer welfare (Haws and Winterich 2013; Ma, Ailawadi, and Grewal 
2013; Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer 2006; Wansink and Chandon 2006; Zlatevska, Dubelaar, 
and Holden 2014). Recently, consumer advocacy groups in the United States have raised 
concerns over the lack of transparency regarding the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in food (Chassy and John Entine 2015; Saletan 2015). These groups assert that 
consumers have the right to know whether their food contains GMOs and thus mandatory 
labeling laws should be implemented (Consumer Reports 2015; Hamblin 2015). Indeed, this 
would have significant implications for firms given that an estimated 70% of processed foods in 
the United States contain GMOs (Scientific American 2013). Although labeling policies are 
drafted to help consumers make informed decisions (Frech and Barksdale 1974; Vermont 2014), 
pundits have been quick to weigh in with the charge that mandatory labeling could do more harm 
than good (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015; Hamblin 2015). The primary concern is that consumers 
might avoid GMOs, and because of this, firms would stop carrying these products. This is what 
transpired following the implementation of GMO labeling laws in Europe. GMO labeling 
ultimately hindered choice and reduced competition as firms scrambled to avoid a potentially 
negative response from consumers (Scientific American 2013).  
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The root of the principled opposition to GMOs begins with the intuitive notion that what is 
natural is inherently good, as well as the general belief that humans are often malevolent and 
deprive nature of its virtues (Leyser 2014; Rozin et al. 2004). These come together to form the 
basis of a moral opposition to human intervention into the food supply (Frewer et al. 2013; Scott, 
Inbar, and Rozin 2016). Critically, there is evidence to suggest that this moral opposition may 
impact the consideration of benefits. For example, in one study, 71% of participants who were 
opposed to GMOs expressed that genetic modification is wrong regardless of whether it results 
in positive outcomes (Scott et al. 2016). This is a considerable marketing problem that has gone 
without notice within the broader political debate around transparent labeling practices.  
As of 2015, the global market value of GMO crops was estimated at $15.3 billion (ISAAA 
2016). Many of these crops have been designed with the intent of increasing nutritional value 
(Gunther 2014), enhancing global food security (Qaim and Kouser 2013), and reducing the need 
for pesticides (Carpenter 2010). Despite the general need for GMO production to meet increasing 
population demand for food, public sentiment has proven to be a considerable barrier (Juma 
2011; Qaim and Kouser 2013; Rotman 2013). Within the growing political discourse around 
GMOs, scholars and practitioners have yet to address the primary issue of moral opposition. This 
is an important question as it could lend critical insight into the psychological basis for 
consumers’ aversion to GMOs. From a managerial and policymaking standpoint, this is also 
relevant if the ultimate goal of food labeling is to help consumers make informed decisions based 
on all relevant information (Caswell and Padberg 1992; Frech and Barksdale 1974).  
In exploring this problem, this dissertation begins with the observation that human 
intervention into an object’s composition is not uniformly problematic. After all, consumers 
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show little resistance to genetically modified (GM) medicine (Zechendorf 1994). Drawing on 
research that distinguishes how people reason about manmade objects (e.g., cars) and naturally 
occurring objects (e.g., apples), I am the first to demonstrate that positioning a genetically 
modified food as manmade can override moral opposition and subsequently elevate preference. 
The theoretical contribution of this work rests on the notion that the moral opposition to human 
intervention into nature is contingent upon the belief that the object ought to be natural in the 
first place. If that initial belief is extinguished, then the commonly observed correlation between 
perceived naturalness and acceptability breaks. The importance of this finding is that 
consumption acceptability is not driven by perceived naturalness per se, but by the belief that the 
object ought to be natural. 
This work is also the first to demonstrate that moral opposition overrides consumers’ 
ability to perceive a GMO’s benefits. Prior research in this area showed that many consumers 
who oppose GMOs explicitly state that they would maintain this stance regardless of any 
benefits these products might offer (Scott et al. 2016). By experimentally reducing moral 
opposition to genetic modification, the studies reported here offer novel insights into the role of 
moral opposition in impeding the perceived functional benefits of a GMO. Specifically, 
circumventing the activation of moral opposition allowed consumers to perceive the functional 
benefits of a GM-labeled food.  
These results also lend theoretical insights to the ideational (i.e. moral) basis of the 
preference for natural (Rozin et al. 2004). Rozin and colleagues inferred that since people 
preferred a natural product that was purportedly chemically identical to a less natural alternative, 
this preference must be ideational (as chemically identical objects should not vary in their 
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instrumental benefits). By overcoming some methodological shortcomings present in prior 
research (Rozin 2005; Rozin et al. 2004), the studies reported here were able to parse out and 
isolate the ideational component of natural preference as it applies to GMOs. 
This dissertation also has important implications for managers. In particular, these studies 
show that by making the object seem manmade to begin with, marketers can override the moral 
response to genetic modification, allowing consumers to perceive the GMO’s benefits, and 
subsequently, increase preference. In fact, the results revealed that some of the highest 
preference ratings emerged for products that were perceived to be the least natural. Taken as a 
whole, this work informs marketers on strategies they can adopt to increase transparency, 
facilitate GMO acceptance, and more effectively navigate mandatory GM food labeling policies. 
This work suggests that one of the worst things firms can do is to present GM foods in a way that 
could allow consumers to infer that they are natural. This is an important point given that GMOs 
typically resemble, and are sold amongst, their naturally grown counterparts. Furthermore, it 
seems that firms can benefit from explicit GM food labeling as long as the marketing mix 
conveys the product for what it is—a manmade object created with intent.   
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Chapter 2 
2   Conceptual Background 
In what follows, I first outline existing theory regarding the preference for natural and how 
this preference impacts consumption. I then cover the literature on people’s moral values related 
to nature and naturalness in general, and highlight prior work demonstrating that there is a moral 
element that appears to underlie consumers’ aversion to GMOs. This section also draws on the 
protected value literature, which suggests that human intervention into nature may have 
implications for consumers’ ability to perceive the benefits of GMOs. From there, I outline the 
psychological essentialism literature and discuss how this has been used to explain the difference 
between how people reason about natural and manmade objects. This is followed by a review of 
the literature regarding what constitutes the essence of manmade objects. I then develop the 
theoretical rationale for why the distinction between manmade objects and naturally occurring 
objects is critical in determining how consumers will respond to GMOs. From this, I predict how 
evaluations of a GMO will differ depending on the cues that marketers adopt when promoting a 
GMO product. 
 
2.1   The Preference for Natural 
A growing body of research has demonstrated that, especially when it comes to food, 
people prefer natural things to their less natural alternatives (Rozin 2005, 2006; Rozin et al. 
2004). In fact, merely labeling a food product as “All Natural” can elicit a positive response from 
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consumers (Rozin et al. 2004). The reason is that consumers infer meaning from the label. Two-
thirds of Americans think the word natural on food packaging means that it is free of artificial 
ingredients, pesticides, or GMOs (Olsen 2014; Rozin, Fischler, and Shields-Argelès 2012). 
However, under federal labeling rules, the word natural carries no such connotation. In fact, both 
the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture allow food producers 
to use the word natural on labels as long as nothing artificial or synthetic has been added “that 
would not normally be expected to be in the food” (Food and Drug Administration 1993, 2407). 
Thus, under federal guidelines, the term natural means little more than generally accepted 
practice.  
Despite the ambiguity in the use of the term, the concept of natural has significant 
implications for consumption. For example, American consumers spent approximately $47 
billion on organic produce in 2016 (Painter 2017). Mounting evidence suggests that this demand 
is primarily driven by perceived naturalness (Lockie et al. 2004; Onyango, Hallman, and Bellows 
2007). The inverse of this is evident in the GMO literature, which supports a relationship 
between low perceptions of naturalness and reduced purchase intent (Frewer, Howard, and 
Shepherd 1996; Tenbült et al. 2005). 
The preference for natural is thought to consist of a combination of four instrumental and 
two ideational beliefs (Rozin et al. 2004). Collectively, these can be viewed as lay beliefs in that 
they are informal intuitions about the world that people acquire either through personal 
experience or environmental cues such as popular discourse within their culture (Morris, Menon, 
and Ames 2001; Ross and Nisbett 2011). Instrumental beliefs refer to the commonly held notion 
that natural entities are functionally superior to their less natural counterparts. This stems from a 
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deeply rooted conviction that human intervention causes damage to nature (Rozin et al. 2004). 
The second belief is that natural entities are better (healthier or more effective). This correlates 
with the first belief, adding that humans often deprive nature of its virtues. The third belief is that 
natural entities are superior on a sensory level—be it taste, durability, or quality. The fourth and 
final instrumental belief is that natural things are purer and, as a result, safer. However, as noted 
by Rozin and colleagues (2004), there is actually little support for the instrumental superiority of 
natural kinds. For example, many natural pesticides are equally, if not more, carcinogenic than 
their synthetic counterparts (Ames, Profet, and Gold 1990; Gold, Slone, and Ames 2001). 
Nevertheless, these instrumental beliefs are both intuitive and prevalent. 
Ideational beliefs, on the other hand, are rooted in the idea that naturally occurring objects 
possess a moral superiority (Rozin et al. 2004). This constitutes the fifth belief for a preference 
for normative order, whereby nature came before humans and thus has privileged moral ground 
(Spranca 1992). This rounds out the sixth belief, that natural is good or “right.” In contrasting 
these two explanations for why people prefer natural, Rozin and colleagues (2004) found that a 
substantial part of the motivation for preferring natural is ideational (moral), as opposed to 
instrumental. This body of work suggests many explicit instrumental concerns about GMO 
production are merely overt rationalizations of latent ideational beliefs. This is consistent with 
the notion that people have a deep connection with nature and consequently view natural things 
positively (Kellert and Wilson 1993). Thus, the preference for natural appears to be rooted in 
people’s moral values regarding the natural environment (Rozin et al. 2004; Sjöberg 2000). Next, 
I will describe the basis of the moral response to humans altering natural objects. Then, I will 
highlight an important implication of this response. 
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2.2   Moral Opposition to Human Intervention into Natural Objects 
While the literature on the preference for natural has dominantly focused on food, this 
affinity is rather broad and also includes things such as natural materials used in built structures 
(e.g., wood) and natural landscapes (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989; Kellert 2011; Kellert and Wilson 
1993; Ulrich 1995). This pervasive attachment to nature is referred to as biophilia (Wilson 1984). 
For example, pioneering research in this area demonstrated that people tend to prefer images of 
natural environments over built environments (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989). Consistent with the 
premise that people deeply value connecting with nature, researchers have found that there are 
numerous benefits to being exposed to nature, such as improved memory (Berman, Jonides, and 
Kaplan 2008), restored attentional capacity (Berto 2005), and reduced hypertension and 
inflammation (Mao et al. 2012). Given the pronounced effects of biophilia, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that people tend to assign a privileged moral status to nature (Cafaro and Primack 
2014; Takala 2004; Vucetich, Bruskotter, and Nelson 2015). 
There is an important corollary to the previously discussed belief that what is natural is 
good or right, and that is what is unnatural is bad or wrong (Takala 2004). Although arguably 
groundless, this notion is highly intuitive and commonly expressed by those opposing GMOs 
(Leyser 2014; Sheehan 2009; Takala 2004). Indeed, like the moral motivation underlying the 
preference for natural, evidence suggests that there is a strong moral motivation underlying the 
opposition to genetic modification (Bredahl 2001; Frewer et al. 2013; Scott et al. 2016). The two 
go hand in hand. For example, consumers’ pre-existing moral values relating to nature appear to 
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be highly influential in shaping how they respond to GMOs (Bredahl 2001; Dreezens et al. 
2005). Notably, this moral response tends to stem from the notion that those who create GMOs 
are tampering with, or violating, nature (Sjöberg 2000).  
 Aside from simply opposing GMOs on moral grounds, there may be additional 
implications resulting from people’s moral values around nature. Research suggests that there are 
certain values which people are fundamentally unwilling to trade off for some other benefit, such 
as money (Baron and Spranca 1997; Fiske and Tetlock 1997). These values, such as the notion 
that nature should be preserved, are referred to as protected values because people believe they 
should be upheld unconditionally (Baron and Spranca 1997). One relevant example of this is the 
case of Golden Rice. Golden Rice is a GMO that was created to alleviate vitamin A deficiency, 
which kills approximately two million people a year and causes blindness in up to half a million 
children (Harmon 2013). Despite the noble intentions driving the creation and cultivation of this 
product, it sparked protests from local groups and ultimately, the destruction of test growing 
plots (Slezak 2013). This offers a clear example of the “moral limits to fungibility” (Fiske and 
Tetlock 1997, 256), in that the local citizens adopted the stance that humans should not intervene 
into nature even if it would prevent serious illness or even the death of millions of people.  
Although human civilizations have always utilized natural resources as a means of 
survival, there is something distinct about the notion of permanently altering or even destroying 
a natural entity (Baron and Spranca 1997). Indeed, this would entail the act of rendering 
something unnatural, which people deem immoral (Takala 2004). If violating a natural entity 
contravenes a protected value, how might people respond to such an act? Research suggests that 
this will elicit a moral response, which leads to punitive reactions and negative judgments (Fiske 
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and Tetlock 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000). Furthermore, Tetlock (2002) notes that people will be 
particularly inclined to reject excuses and justifications for such violations. Since utilitarian 
benefits can be viewed as a potential justification for the act of genetic modification, this 
suggests consumers may be biased against perceiving those benefits. What this also means is that 
overriding the moral response to genetic modification may facilitate consumers’ ability to 
perceive a GM food’s benefits. In what follows, I outline the psychological essentialism 
literature and discuss how this has been used to understand how people reason about natural 
objects (Margolis and Laurence 2007). 
 
2.3   Psychological Essentialism and Natural Objects 
Psychological essentialism refers to the tendency for people to reason about things in 
terms of their underlying essence (Gelman 2003; Medin and Ortony 1989). An essence refers to 
an object’s true nature; a deep causal factor that is responsible for the object’s category 
membership and observable, surface level properties (Gelman 2003; Medin 1989). People’s 
notion of an essence may be construed in a number of ways, from abstract concepts like a soul to 
more concrete concepts, like DNA (Gelman 2003). However, essentialism also frequently 
emerges in a way that is not represented by a specific concept but rather the simple idea that a 
category has a core, regardless of whether that core is known (Gelman 2003). Thus, people 
possess an “essence placeholder” in that they may simply believe that members of different 
categories are fundamentally distinct in terms of some deep, unobservable factor (Medin 1989). 
It is also important to note that psychological essentialism does not entail a metaphysical claim 
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about the actual existence of an essence; it simply refers to the pervasive tendency for people to 
think about objects as though they have an essence (Medin and Ortony 1989).  
Fundamental to the essentialist account of categorization is the notion that people reason 
about the casual relationships between features (Gelman 2003; Gelman and Kalish 1993). As 
previously mentioned, the concept of an underlying essence is used to refer to the primary causal 
factor that determines what something is (Medin 1989). This account emerged as a response to 
the inadequacies of two dominant cognitive models of categories: the classical view, which 
proposes that categories are defined by lists of necessary and sufficient features, and the 
prototype view, which argues that categories are defined by one’s notion of what represents the 
best example of the category. These models are notably acausal and fundamentally predicated on 
a similarity criterion in that they argue that category membership is determined based on 
similarity to a feature listing (classical view) or similarity to a prototype (prototype view; Smith 
and Medin 1981). However, Murphy and Medin (1985) argue that similarity alone is inadequate 
to explain why a given object belongs to a category. For example, judgments of similarity 
depend entirely on the features one decides to focus on. As a result, a cat and a smartphone could 
be said to have many features in common since they are both smaller than a car, weigh less than 
five tons, are visible to the naked eye, and so on. Additionally, similarity based theories do not 
propose how features should be weighted. For example, when classifying animals, if one were to 
put more weight on habitat than the way in which something breathes, whales could be classified 
as fish (Gelman 2003). In response to the inability of similarity to explain conceptual coherence, 
it was proposed that concepts are made coherent because people draw on domain specific 
knowledge about the world, including causal knowledge (Murphy and Medin 1985).  
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The essentialist view addresses the major shortcomings of the classical and prototype 
accounts by assuming that causal inferences matter and that causes are more important than 
effects (Gelman and Kalish 1993). Ahn (1998) referred to this as the causal status hypothesis and 
an accumulating body of evidence supports this premise (Ahn, Gelman, et al. 2000; Ahn, Kim, et 
al. 2000). With respect to natural objects, genetic composition is the most central feature in 
categorization because it is causally primary relative to any other features that the entity would 
possess (Ahn 1998). Thus, by accounting for people’s tendency to apply causal knowledge when 
categorizing objects, the essentialist view was able to offer a superior account of categorization 
and conceptual coherence. 
When reasoning about a naturally occurring object, people typically do not have direct 
access to information about the structure or integrity of its unobservable properties and in 
particular, its essence. This raises the question of how this unobservable property is inferred for 
natural objects. Rehder and Kim (2009) demonstrated that people begin with observable features 
then reason backwards to infer unobservable properties. That is, perceptual cues are used as a 
diagnostic indicator of a natural object’s deep, unobservable properties. It is in this sense that 
surface level properties can shape beliefs about an object’s status as natural. This is important 
because, given people’s moral values regarding nature, whether a consumer possesses the a 
priori belief that something is natural may be critical in determining how they respond to genetic 
modification. Specifically, it suggests that moral opposition may not activate in response to 
human intervention into an object that does not appear to be natural in the first place. 
In the next section, I highlight some key differences between how people reason about 
manmade and natural objects. I then cover the debate around how people categorize manmade 
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objects. This will ultimately serve to inform predictions regarding how consumers will respond 
to a GMO when it is positioned as being a manmade (as opposed to a natural) object. 
 
2.4   The Distinction Between Manmade and Natural Objects 
When confronted with an object, people reason about it differently if they perceive it to 
be manmade (e.g., a clock) as opposed to natural (e.g., a tomato; Margolis and Laurence 2007; 
Medin, Lynch, and Solomon 2000). One key difference between these types of objects is the 
process by which they are categorized. As previously discussed, naturally occurring objects 
intuitively garner a belief in an underlying essence that is responsible for the object’s surface 
level properties and features (Keil 1989; Matan and Carey 2001; Medin and Ortony 1989). A 
violation of the inherent causal relationship between something’s essence and its surface level 
properties makes it difficult to accept the object as natural. For example, Keil (1989) showed that 
despite an animal looking like a skunk, smelling like a skunk, and acting like a skunk, it will not 
be classified as a skunk if these properties are the result of human intervention (e.g., plastic 
surgery or chemical modification). Furthermore, any indication that a natural object lacks the 
expected feature associations quickly calls its category membership into question (Hampton et 
al. 2009). 
People also believe that all natural category members possess their shared essential 
properties to the same extent. This results in categorization being absolute for natural objects 
(Diesendruck and Gelman 1999; Estes 2003, 2004). For example, people give a more definitive 
and extreme category membership response when asked if a caterpillar is an insect compared to 
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when asked if a stool is a chair (Diesendruck and Gelman 1999). This suggests that people 
consider additional information beyond what a manmade object is called when making 
judgments about it. Exactly what it is that people consider lies at the root of the debate 
surrounding how manmade objects are categorized.  
Manmade objects are somewhat unique in that they do not have an underlying essence in 
the way that natural objects do (Bloom 1998). For example, substance is irrelevant to a manmade 
object’s identity; one would never run a chemical analysis to determine if something is a table 
(Keil 1989). Then how do people categorize manmade objects? It seems that manmade objects 
are not merely categorized in terms of their superficial, physical features. For example, a digital 
bedside clock bears very little resemblance to Big Ben, though there is little question about their 
shared status as clocks. Another possibility is that people use specific functional features as 
necessary and sufficient indicators of what a manmade object is (Kelter et al. 1984; Tversky and 
Hemenway 1984). However, evidence suggests that neither functional features (e.g., carries 
people across a body of water), nor physical features (e.g., wedge shaped with a sail and anchor) 
alone are sufficient to determine categorization for a manmade object (i.e., a boat; Malt and 
Johnson 1992). Thus, the debate on how manmade objects are categorized continued (Bloom 
1998, 2007; Malt and Johnson 1998). 
Although manmade objects do not possess a defining, compositional substance like 
natural objects do (Keil 1989), there is reason to suspect that people may still apply essentialist 
reasoning to these objects. Research has demonstrated that people exhibit a general inclination to 
believe that objects can be imbued with an essence (Argo, Dahl, and Morales 2006, 2008; 
Hingston, McManus, and Noseworthy 2017; Kramer and Block 2014; Lee et al. 2011; Morales 
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and Fitzsimons 2007; Rozin and Nemeroff 1990). For example, the common belief that an object 
can be imbued with a person’s essence through physical contact (i.e., the law of contagion; 
Nemeroff and Rozin 2000; Rozin et al. 1989; Rozin and Nemeroff 1990) has been used to 
explain the surprisingly high prices paid for celebrity memorabilia and why people become 
squeamish at the thought of wearing a garment previously worn by someone they think is evil 
(Nemeroff and Rozin 1994; Newman and Bloom 2014; Newman, Diesendruck, and Bloom 
2011). Furthermore, people believe that objects can be imbued with the essence of a brand or 
creator, and this has implications for how consumers value the product (Newman and Dhar 2014; 
Smith, Newman, and Dhar 2015). This latter finding is particularly interesting because it 
suggests that if a manmade object has an essence, it may be somehow related to its creator.  
Next, I will discuss an existing theoretical account of how manmade objects are 
categorized. I will then turn my attention to how this relates to the essence of manmade objects, 
and what this might mean for consumers’ evaluations of GMOs. 
 
2.5   Intent as the Essential Structure of Manmade Objects 
If manmade objects’ category membership cannot be reliably explained by their physical 
composition, features, or how they are used, this raises the question of how these objects are 
categorized. The intentional historical theory of artifact categorization proposes that manmade 
objects are categorized based on their intended function (Bloom 1996, 1998; Gutheil et al. 2004). 
This theory serves to explain why feature overlap and object use are insufficient in determining 
how manmade objects are categorized (Bloom 1996). For instance, simply because someone 
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stands on a table does not suggest that it is now, or was ever intended to be, a step stool. 
Furthermore, although step stools and tables share many features, such as legs and a flat surface, 
they are arguably distinct concepts.  
Bloom (1996, 1998) proposes that understanding what a manmade object is necessarily 
entails reasoning about the function that it was intended to serve. Consistent with this theorizing, 
a creator’s intention for an object has been shown to be a strong determinant of categorization 
and functional expectations (Barrett, Laurence, and Margolis 2008; Chaigneau, Castillo, and 
Martínez 2008; Gelman and Bloom 2000). For example, when categorizing a manmade object, 
people weigh its intended function more heavily than its perceived function (e.g., a teapot used to 
water flowers is still a teapot; Hall 1995). People also weigh a manmade object’s explicit intent 
over its perceived form (e.g., something that looks like an umbrella but was intended to be a 
lampshade is considered to be a lampshade; Noseworthy and Trudel 2011; Rips 1989). In fact, 
intended function is so influential that even children as young as the age of three refer to intent 
when naming manmade objects (Gelman and Bloom 2000). With respect to the critical role of 
intended function when categorizing manmade objects, it has been asserted that the original 
intended function constitutes a manmade object’s essence (Matan and Carey 2001). This is also 
consistent with the causal status hypothesis given that the creator’s intentions for the object 
would represent the primary cause that then determines the object’s features (Ahn 1998). It is in 
this sense that the process of reasoning about manmade objects is fundamentally distinct from 
reasoning about naturally occurring objects. Specifically, the former necessarily entails inferring 
functional intent whereas the latter does not.  
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Given the emphasis put on intent, it is not surprising that manmade objects are typically 
organized by function (Barton and Komatsu 1989). In a sense, the link between how the object is 
conveyed and inferences about its functionality is fundamentally unique to manmade things. As a 
result, manmade objects have gradients (e.g., any one smartphone may be more or less 
representative of the smartphone category; Estes 2004). Functional intent also determines how 
manmade objects are evaluated. For example, it would seem absurd to evaluate a stool negatively 
due to its poor ability to accommodate an afternoon nap since it was never intended to be used in 
such a way. Instead, people infer that manmade objects will behave as they were designed to 
(Dennett 1987), and assess them accordingly. Thus, it stands to reason that consumers may 
respond to a GMO very differently if they are cued to view it as being manmade. Specifically, 
instead of responding to the violation of a natural entity, they should be inclined to evaluate the 
GMO in terms of its perceived ability to fulfil its intended function. 
In what follows, I will briefly summarize the literature discussed here and develop the 
formal hypotheses that will be tested in this dissertation. Specifically, I demonstrate that the 
distinction between how people reason about manmade and natural objects lends predictions 
regarding the circumstances when consumers’ moral opposition to genetic modification will be 
reduced and when consumers will respond positively to GM foods and even perceive their 
benefits. 
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2.6   Hypotheses 
Where the distinction between natural and manmade objects becomes particularly relevant 
to GM foods is in how evaluations may be differentially impacted by human intervention. To 
recap, human intervention through genetic modification violates a natural entity’s essence, 
rendering it unnatural. Given that people believe that tampering with nature is immoral (Leyser 
2014; Sheehan 2009; Sjöberg 2000; Takala 2004), genetic modification elicits a negative 
response. However, for manmade objects, human intervention is both normative and 
purposeful—there is nothing inherently immoral about human intervention into manmade things. 
Therefore, if the negative response to genetic modification is rooted in consumers’ moral 
response to the notion of humans violating nature, consumers should be more accepting of a food 
product labeled as Genetically Modified (GM-labeled) when it is positioned as being manmade, 
as opposed to being positioned as natural. Of course, such a tactic should markedly differ when it 
comes to food products labeled as All Natural (AN-labeled). In this instance, considering the 
strong emphasis on naturalness (Rozin 2006; Rozin et al. 2004), consumers should prefer an AN-
labeled food product when it is positioned as natural, as opposed to manmade. Stated formally, 
 
H1: Consumers are more willing to purchase a GM-labeled food product when marketing 
cues suggest that it is manmade as opposed to natural. Conversely, consumers are more 
willing to purchase an AN-labeled food product when marketing cues suggest that it is 
natural as opposed to manmade.   
 
  
 
 
19 
Then there is the question of what will constitute the optimal scenario for a GM-labeled 
food. Recall that intended function (i.e., why the object was made) constitutes the essence of 
manmade objects and that this fundamentally distinguishes manmade objects from their naturally 
occurring counterparts (Bloom 1998; Matan and Carey 2001). This suggests that if marketing 
cues can convey to consumers that a GM-labeled food is manmade, a statement regarding the 
product’s intent should serve to solidify its status as a manmade object. Arguably, although an 
object may appear to be manmade based on marketing cues, one cannot fully understand and 
evaluate a manmade object without knowing its intended function (Bloom 1996). Thus, if 
viewing a GM-labeled food as manmade overrides the negative response to genetic modification, 
the addition of a transparent disclosure of the product’s intent should elicit the most positive 
response. This ultimately suggests that preference for a GM-labeled food presented with a 
manmade cue will be higher when a statement of intent is present (vs. absent). Conversely, 
although naturally occurring objects can be assigned a function (e.g., water can quench thirst), 
educated adults generally refrain from reasoning about these objects as having an inherent 
function (Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston 2013). This implies that a statement of intent would 
have little impact on consumers’ preference for an AN-labeled product. Stated formally, 
 
H2: The strongest preference for a GM-labeled food product emerges when marketing cues 
suggest it is manmade and the product is accompanied by a statement of intent. Intent 
has no effect on an AN-labeled food product, regardless of the marketing cue.  
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The final goal was to isolate the factors driving the predicted increase in preference for 
GM-labeled foods positioned as manmade. To that end, the relationship between moral 
opposition and perceived utilitarian benefits was the primary focus. Given that people prefer 
natural and possess moral values about the preservation of nature (Rozin et al. 2004; Sjöberg 
2000), they tend to weigh these values over any functional benefits that result from human 
intervention into a natural object (Scholderer and Frewer 2003; Scott et al. 2016). Conversely, 
since there is nothing immoral about human intervention into a manmade object, moral 
opposition should not activate when the GM-labeled food is positioned as manmade. 
Furthermore, given the emphasis on a manmade object’s intended function, human intervention 
promotes inferences about the purpose and functional implications of the intervention (Bloom 
1996; Dennett 1987). If the object is perceived to be able to achieve its intended function, then 
arguably, this object is “good.” Stated formally, 
 
H3: The effect of positioning a GM-labeled food as manmade with an explicit statement of 
intent on purchase intentions is serially mediated by moral opposition through perceived 
utilitarian benefits, such that the decrease in moral opposition corresponds with an 
increase in perceived utilitarian benefits, which in turn, augments purchase intentions.  
  
In sum, it was predicted that the negative response to the genetic modification of food is 
contingent upon how people reason about the object. Thus, cueing consumers to view a GM-
labeled food as manmade (as opposed to natural), and conveying the product’s intended function 
should override this negative response.  
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Chapter 3 
3   Study 1 
The objectives of Study 1 were to test whether the way in which consumers reason about a 
GM-labeled food influences preference and also to explore predictable gradients within this 
process. Specifically, if my theorizing is correct, consumers should demonstrate the greatest 
preference for a GM-labeled food when it looks like a manmade product and is accompanied by 
a statement for why it was made—i.e., a statement of intent. Furthermore, I predicted that the 
positive response for a GMO positioned as a manmade product with a statement of intent would 
emerge despite a drop in perceived naturalness. Thus, in contrast to the established correlation 
between perceptions of naturalness and preference (Frewer et al. 1996; Rozin 2006; Tenbült et 
al. 2005), I expected to augment purchase intentions for something that was fundamentally 
unnatural. 
 
3.1   Method 
3.1.1   Participants and design 
Three hundred and fifty-one consumers (55.3% female; Mage = 26.6) were recruited 
through public posters and paid $20 for participating in an advertisement study. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (Label: GM-Labeled vs. AN-Labeled) × 4 
(Positioning: Manmade Cue with Intent vs. Manmade Cue without Intent vs. Natural Cue with 
Intent vs. Natural Cue without Intent) between-subjects factorial design. 
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Although seemingly complex, this design was carefully crafted in accordance with prior 
work on how people reason about manmade and natural objects. Given that physical appearance 
plays a role in classification (Hampton et al. 2009; Malt and Johnson 1992), manipulating 
whether an object looks natural or manmade should cue people to reason about it accordingly. 
However, unlike natural objects, intent also comes into play for manmade objects (Bloom 1996, 
1998). As previously discussed, although an object may appear to be manmade based on its 
physical structure, one cannot fully understand and evaluate a manmade object without knowing 
its intended function (Bloom 1996). It is in this sense that physical structure and intended 
function are related and act together to complete one’s understanding of a manmade object. 
Thus, by manipulating the product’s Label (GM-labeled vs. AN-labeled) and by creating a single 
Positioning factor with four levels to account for the combination of physical appearance and 
intent, this design offered the ability to manipulate the extent to which the product would be 
viewed as manmade or natural. 
The stimuli for this study were designed to represent both a conservative and realistic test 
of H1. Inspiration was taken from the recent trend of well-known brands engaging in the 
manipulation of food products (e.g., Coke’s new Fairlife Milk). The goal was to take an 
analogous position and use a well-known brand and have it foray into the marketing and 
manipulation of something that is typically natural. In this case, fruit was chosen as the product 
and some noise was deliberately introduced for the sake of ecological validity (e.g., stylized 
fonts, marketing claims, and logos). Furthermore, the manipulation of the label was conservative 
in that it incorporated the most severe case of a GMO by explicitly stating “genetically 
modified” and acknowledging the splicing of DNA from two distinct natural entities—a 
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manipulation known to cause the most severe drop in perceived naturalness and acceptability, 
and one that represents the majority of GMOs (Rozin 2005, 2006). 
For the Positioning manipulation, ad imagery was used to promote the product in its 
natural setting (i.e., growing in a tree) or showcase the product packaged more as a manmade 
good (i.e., in a box). In the latter case it was critical that people could see that the object was a 
fruit in order to be conservative in that natural inferences would still be available. It was also 
critical that the packaging more closely approximated that of a manmade product than something 
one would find in the produce section of a grocery store. The end result of screening various 
stock photographs for plausibility, natural inferences, and commercial associations, was the 
“Fruit by Nike” photograph by artist Peddy Mergui (2016). Thus, the Nike brand was held 
constant across all conditions. 
Finally, if people are more likely to view an object as manmade when it is packaged like 
a manmade product, and if intent matters for manmade things (Bloom 1996), then the addition of 
a statement noting the object’s intent should complete this process. To that end, the product was 
given a category relevant statement of intent: “The goal was to reduce the reliance on sports 
energy drinks, avoiding hyponatremia (over-hydration) of the cells, which causes dangerously 
low sodium levels.” This intended function was adopted given the thematic fit with Nike (i.e., 
athletic performance). Not only is hyponatremia an actual issue (Dugas 2006), but the statement 
also afforded the plausible guise that an energy fruit would solve this issue by allowing 
consumers to eat, as opposed to drink, their supplement. Thus, the label and positioning 
manipulations were combined to configure eight variations of the same stimulus (see Appendix 
A). 
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3.1.2   Design predictions 
Based on my theorizing, the strongest preference for a GM-labeled food should emerge 
when there are cues to support viewing it as a manmade object (i.e., when the entity is packaged 
as a manmade product accompanied by a statement of intent: stimulus i in Appendix A. Roman 
numerals represent each respective stimulus in the appendix). Conversely, the strongest 
preference for an AN-labeled food should emerge when there are cues to facilitate viewing it as a 
natural object (i.e., when the entity is seen in natural form; stimuli vi and viii). Critically, given 
that people guard against reasoning about functional intent for natural entities (Kelemen et al. 
2013), preference for the natural product should not depend on the presence of a statement of 
intent (vi and viii should be equally favored). This design also lends predictions of suboptimal 
outcomes. Specifically, the most detrimental outcome for a GMO should emerge when the 
available cues lead consumers to view it as a natural object (i.e., when the entity looks like a 
natural object with no statement of intent: stimulus vii). Note: this is how consumers most 
commonly encounter GMOs in that they are typically sold amongst natural foods and/or retain 
the physical appearance of their non-GM counterparts. Lastly, the most detrimental outcome for 
a natural product should come when the marketing cues suggest it is manmade, but even then, 
this should not vary by intent (stimuli ii and iv should be equally unfavorable). 
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3.1.3   Pretest 
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; N = 80; 51.2% female; Mage = 
36.37) were randomly assigned to view either a photograph of the packaged fruit or a photograph 
of fruit hanging on a tree in a between-subjects main effect design. The images were identical to 
the advertising stimuli used in the study, except that all ad copy was removed. Participants rated 
the similarity of the object depicted in the image to two randomized comparisons: “a thing that 
was created by humans” (manmade object comparison) and “a thing that grows naturally in the 
wild” (natural comparison; anchored: 1 = not at all similar; 9 = extremely similar). Given that 
there was both a between-subjects independent variable (i.e., the manmade or natural cue) and a 
repeated measures dependent variable, a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. The results 
revealed that the photograph of packaged fruit was more comparable to a manmade object (M = 
6.70) than to a natural object (M = 3.55; F(1, 78) = 37.80, p < .001). Conversely, the photograph 
of fruit hanging on a tree was more comparable to a natural object (M = 7.95) than to a manmade 
object (M = 2.50; F(1, 78) = 113.15, p < .001). Therefore, this cue manipulation was carried 
forward and used in the study. 
 
3.1.4   Procedures and dependent measures 
Participants were brought into a product testing lab under the explicit guise that the study 
was interested in their thoughts on modern advertisements. Participants were then directed to a 
computer screen and told that they will see a working version of a print advertisement. They 
were asked to consider how they would feel if they saw this product while shopping. Participants 
were permitted to view the ad at their leisure and were informed that once ready, they may click 
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“next” to fill out an electronic questionnaire. The questionnaire commenced with the core 
dependent variable of purchase intent, collected on a three item, 7-point scale (“unlikely/likely,” 
“improbable/probable,” and “impossible/possible”; Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990). Next, 
perceptions of naturalness were collected on a single item (anchored: 0 = “not natural at all [like 
a plastic toy model of a car]” to 100 = “completely natural [like a tree growing on a mountain 
peak that has never been visited by humans]”; Rozin 2006). This was captured in order to rule 
out the alternative explanation that preference for the GM-Labeled product increased because it 
was perceived as being more natural (given the established positive relationship between 
naturalness and preference; Rozin 2006; Tenbült et al. 2005). The questionnaire concluded with 
probes of awareness and demographic questions. 
 
3.2   Results 
3.2.1   Purchase intent 
A two-way ANOVA on purchase intent (α = .73) yielded a significant Label × 
Positioning interaction (F(3, 343) = 10.32, p < .001, η2 = .08). As illustrated in Figure 1, pairwise 
comparisons confirmed that participants were more likely to purchase the GMO when it was 
viewed with a manmade cue accompanied by a statement of intent (i) (M = 4.54) than when 
viewed either with a manmade cue and without intent (iii) (M = 3.72; F(1, 343) = 8.78, p < .005, 
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η2 = .02), natural cue with intent (v) (M = 3.93; F(1, 343) = 4.81, p < .05, η2 = .01), or natural cue 
without intent (vii) (M = 3.25; F(1, 343) = 21.73, p < .001, η2 = .06).1  
Then, a complex contrast was conducted to further test the prediction that the optimal 
scenario for a GM-labeled food would emerge when it both appeared manmade and was 
accompanied by a statement of intent (H2). A complex contrast entails testing the difference 
between combinations of experimental conditions. This analysis revealed that stimulus i in 
Appendix A (the GMO most likely to be viewed as manmade) was favored above a linear 
combination of all other cells within the GMO label condition (Fψ(1, 343) = 16.06, p < .001, η2 = 
.04), whereas stimulus vii (the GMO most likely to be viewed as a natural object) was least 
favored (Fψ(1, 343) = 12.99, p < .001, η2 = .03). 
As predicted, the effects were quite different for the naturally grown product. Consistent 
with the findings that people guard against reasoning about naturally occurring objects in terms 
of their function (Kelemen et al. 2013), participants were more likely to purchase the natural 
product when viewed with a natural cue (vi and viii), regardless of whether intent was presented 
(Mvi = 4.80 vs. Mvii = 4.89, p = .76), compared to when viewed either with a manmade cue and 
without intent (iv) (M = 4.22; F(1, 343) = 5.67, p < .05, η2 = .01 and F(1, 343) = 4.33, p < .05, η2 
                                                
 
 
1 Simple effects were analyzed using the pooled error term from the full ANOVA, as opposed to 
manually splitting the file with two or more unique error terms. This explains the inflated 
denominator degrees of freedom (i.e., it does not indicate how many individuals made up the 
comparison). Analyzing the data this way was deemed appropriate given that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was met and carried with it the benefit of enhancing the statistical 
power of the test. 
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= .03, respectively) or a manmade cue with intent (ii) (M = 4.04; F(1, 343) = 9.41, p < .005, η2 = 
.03 and F(1, 343) = 7.67, p < .01, η2 = .02, respectively). Similar to the natural cue results, a 
statement of intent did not influence participants’ likelihood of purchasing the natural product 
presented with a manmade cue (Mii = 4.04 vs. Miv = 4.22, p = .51). Therefore, as detailed in the 
design predictions, positioning the product as manmade (i.e., in packaging and with an explicit 
intent) only increased preference for the GMO. In fact, although my theorizing was across 
Positioning, there was a single instance in the design when a GMO was preferred to a natural 
product, and that was when both products were were packaged like manmade products and 
accompanied by a statement of intent (Mi = 4.54 vs. Mii = 4.04; F(1, 343) = 3.28, p = .07, η2 = 
.01). Finally, although this study was analyzed as a 2 × 4 design (because the manmade cue and 
statement of intent are not independent), it may be useful from a substantive point of view to 
split the cue and a statement of intent into different independent variables, thus making it a three-
way design. See Appendix B for additional analyses conducted based on this alternative design. 
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Figure 1: Purchase Intent Results for Study 1 
 
3.2.2   Confound check: Perceived naturalness  
A two-way ANOVA on perceived naturalness revealed the expected main effect of 
Label, such that participants perceived the AN-Labeled product to be more natural (M = 83.14) 
than its GM-Labeled counterpart (M = 61.77; F(1, 343) = 147.16, p < .001, η2 = .28). There was 
also a main effect of Positioning (F(3, 343) = 6.49, p < .001, η2 = .04). Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed that although manmade cue with intent did not vary from manmade cue without intent 
(M = 66.99 vs. M = 70.23; p = .18), it was perceived as significantly less natural than the 
products seen either with a natural cue with intent (M = 74.23; F(1, 343) = 8.53, p < .005, η2 = 
.02) or natural cue without intent (M = 77.20; F(1, 343) = 17.01, p < .001, η2 = .03; see Table 1). 
The Label × Positioning interaction was not significant (p = .22). Although not predicted, the 
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main effect of Positioning makes sense considering the anchors on the scale adapted from Rozin 
(2006) represent a manmade object on one end (“Like a plastic toy model of a car”) and a 
naturally occurring object on the other (“Like a tree growing on a mountain peak that has never 
been visited by humans”). Nevertheless, the Label manipulation worked as expected and did not 
interact with Positioning. 
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3.3   Discussion 
The results of Study 1 demonstrated that the negative response to GMOs is highly 
contingent on how marketers convey the product. In support of H1, when the product was 
accompanied by cues that it was manmade, genetic modification did not elicit a negative 
response. Thus, unlike prior work (Frewer et al. 1996; Rozin 2006; Tenbült et al. 2005), I found 
that preference for a GMO is a function of how consumers reason about the product, not the 
degree to which it is seen as natural. Indeed, the GMO that was packaged like a manmade 
product and accompanied by a statement of intent had one of the lowest naturalness ratings, yet 
was still quite desirable. Furthermore, the lowest purchase intent out of all GMO conditions (and 
all Natural conditions, for that matter) was the GMO that featured cues that it was natural. These 
results suggest that the aversion to GMOs may only emerge when consumers see the product as a 
natural object that humans have violated. This is particularly relevant to marketers, given that 
 Table 1: Treatment Means and Cell Counts for Study 1 
 
 AN-Labeled GM-Labeled 
 Manmade 
Cue + 
Intent 
(i) 
Manmade 
Cue – 
Intent 
(iii) 
Natural 
Cue + 
Intent 
(v) 
Natural 
Cue – 
Intent 
(vii) 
Manmade 
Cue + 
Intent 
(ii) 
Manmade 
Cue – 
Intent 
(iv) 
Natural 
Cue + 
Intent 
(vi) 
Natural 
Cue – 
Intent 
(viii) 
 
Purchase Intent 04.04 
(01.38) 
04.22 
(01.23) 
04.80 
(01.14) 
04.89 
(01.28) 
04.54 
(01.48) 
03.72 
(01.21) 
03.93 
(01.25) 
03.25 
(01.40) 
Naturalness  75.91 
(20.03) 
79.28 
(17.63) 
85.64 
(13.94) 
90.50 
(09.02) 
58.07 
(16.93) 
61.39 
(15.06) 
62.82 
(15.53) 
63.91 
(20.49) 
Cell Size 44 43 44 44 44 44 44 44 
 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses; Roman numerals correspond to stimuli in Appendix A.  
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most GMOs look natural or are typically presented amongst their natural counterparts with no 
statement of intent.  
These findings also highlighted the critical role of intent. Intended function is essential to 
understanding manmade objects (Bloom 1996, 1998) and is therefore necessary to support a 
manmade cue in allowing consumers to view the product as manmade. This assumption was 
validated for all studies through pilot testing (see Appendices D, F, and I). Given this, all 
subsequent studies were designed to include a statement of intent across all conditions. This also 
afforded the benefit of holding the amount of information conveyed constant across all 
conditions. As a whole, these results supported the prediction that the negative response to 
genetic modification would be reduced when the object is viewed as being being manmade. The 
question was, why? This led to the second study. 
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Chapter 4 
4   Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to take the phenomenon into the field to explore what was driving 
preference. The first step was to test the premise that making a GM-labeled food look manmade 
alters the moral response to genetic modification. As discussed, researchers have shown that the 
strong moral opposition to GMOs is rooted in the notion that tampering with nature is inherently 
immoral (Leyser 2014; Sheehan 2009; Sjöberg 2000; Takala 2004). However, there is nothing 
immoral about humans altering manmade objects. While natural entities are viewed as being 
sacred in a sense (Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000), it would be surprising to 
observe consumers expressing that it is immoral to change the way a toaster functions. Given this 
distinction between the response to human intervention into manmade and natural objects, it was 
predicted that a GM-labeled food that is positioned as being manmade would not activate moral 
opposition, and this should account for the subsequent increase in preference. 
 
4.1   Method 
4.1.1   Participants and design 
Consumers (N = 160; 46.9% female; Mage = 32.3) were recruited at a farmer’s market in 
the Midwest United States and paid $20 for participating and they were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions in a 2 (Label: GM-Labeled vs. AN-labeled) × 2 (Positioning: Control 
[Red] vs. Manmade Cue [Blue]) between-subjects factorial design. 
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The product selected was apples. Instead of altering ad imagery, I took a more nuanced 
approach and altered the product itself—specifically, the product’s color. This afforded an 
opportunity to employ a pure control condition, whereby a manmade cue (i.e., a blue dyed apple) 
could be compared to an unaltered condition (i.e., a standard red apple; see Appendix C). The 
manmade manipulation followed the controversial practice of dying fruits in order to make them 
more vibrant (Vandersteen 2011), except here the color that was used was unassociated with a 
natural apple.  
 
4.1.2   Pretest 
Participants from MTurk (N = 80; 48.8% female; Mage = 36.65) were randomly assigned 
to view either a blue apple or an unaltered red apple in a between-subjects design. Participants 
were asked to rate the apple using the same items described in the Study 1 pretest. The results 
revealed that the blue apple was more comparable to a manmade object (M = 5.59) than to a 
natural object (M = 4.00; F(1, 78) = 7.81, p < .01). Conversely, the red apple was more 
comparable to a natural object (M = 7.59) than to a manmade object (M = 3.69; F(1, 78) = 44.88, 
p < .001). Therefore, this cue manipulation was carried forward and used in the study. 
 
4.1.3   Procedures and dependent measures 
The study was conducted by two confederates located at separate locations in a farmer’s 
market. The cover story was that a major farming conglomerate is looking to introduce a new 
variety of apple and before doing so, its representatives wanted to hear some initial impressions 
about the product. Thus, this story was designed such that the producer was associated with 
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natural products. This allowed me to rule out the possibility that consumers in Study 1 exhibited 
a stronger preference for the GM-labeled food when they viewed it as manmade simply because 
the brand (Nike) was dominantly associated with manmade products. If the current theorizing is 
correct, cueing consumers to view the GM-labeled food as manmade should augment preference 
even if the firm is associated with natural products. 
Following the cover story, the research assistants presented participants with a pamphlet 
and directed them to view two apples on a table. The apple on the right either looked like a 
typical apple (control) or was blue in color (manmade cue). The apple on the left was always a 
typical, unaltered apple. The pamphlet stated that the apple on the left was their standard offering 
and the apple on the right was their new “naturally grown” (“genetically modified”) variety. 
Each condition explicitly conveyed that the goal was to cultivate a variety that would “reduce a 
farmer’s reliance on pesticides.” Nothing was mentioned about the apple’s color. This claim was 
selected because reduced pesticide use is a common reason for cultivating GMOs (Carpenter 
2010; Wossink and Denaux 2006) and because pesticides are a concern for a majority of 
consumers (Govindasamy and Italia 1999).  
After reading the pamphlet, participants were handed a tablet computer to complete what 
was conveyed as a brief consumer response survey. Purchase intent and perceived naturalness 
were captured using the same items detailed in Study 1. Moral opposition was captured on a 
single item (“Selling this product is morally wrong”; anchored: 1 = not at all; 9 = very much; 
Laham, Alter, and Goodwin 2009). The survey concluded with basic demographic questions. 
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4.2   Results 
4.2.1   Purchase intent 
A two-way ANOVA on purchase intent (α = .70) yielded only a significant Label × 
Positioning interaction (F(1, 156) = 11.58, p < .005, η2 = .06). As illustrated in Figure 2, simple 
effects further confirmed H1 in that participants were more likely to purchase the GM-labeled 
apple in the manmade cue condition (M = 4.43) rather than in the control condition (M = 3.80; 
F(1, 156) = 4.57, p < .05, η2 = .03). Conversely, participants were more likely to purchase the 
AN-labeled apple in the control condition (M = 4.73) rather than in the manmade cue condition 
(M = 3.94; F(1, 156) = 7.15, p < .01, η2 = .04).2 The next question was whether this difference 
was being directly influenced by moral opposition. 
 
                                                
 
 
2 Another way to look at this is that purchase intent did not diminish and was in fact elevated for 
the GM relative to the AN product when both looked manmade (MGM-labeled = 4.43 vs. MAN-labeled 
= 3.94; F(1, 156) = 2.76, p = .09), but purchase intent for the GMO declined markedly when both 
looked like ordinary apples (MGM-labeled = 3.80 vs. MAN-labeled = 4.73; F(1, 156) = 9.94, p < .005). 
  
 
 
37 
 
 
 
4.2.2   Moral opposition 
Overall, despite relatively low means for moral opposition across all conditions, the 
results were as predicted. Consistent with prior work, there was a significant main effect of Label 
on moral opposition, such that consumers were more morally opposed to the sale of a GM-
labeled apple (M = 1.96) than to the sale of the AN-labeled apple (M = 1.50; F(1, 156) = 9.81, p 
< .005, η2 = .06). The main effect of Positioning was not significant (MControl = 1.66 vs. MManmade 
Cue = 1.80, p = .35). Critically, the effect of Label was qualified by a significant Label × 
Positioning interaction (F(1, 156) = 6.88, p < .05, η2 = .03). As predicted, participants were less 
morally opposed to the GM-labeled apple in the manmade cue condition (M = 1.70) compared to 
the control (M = 2.22; F(1, 156) = 6.32, p < .05, η2 = .03). Moral opposition did not differ by 
Positioning for the AN-labeled apple (MControl = 1.38 vs. MManmade Cue = 1.63; p = .23). This was 
Figure 2: Purchase intent results for Study 2 
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consistent with the notion that no moral violation had taken place in the case of the AN-labelled 
apple. Indeed, debriefs confirmed that consumers did not infer chemical or genetic intervention 
into the blue apple. Rather, given the farmer’s market setting, they tended to infer selective 
breeding or domestication.  
To determine whether the decrease in moral opposition accounted for the increase in 
purchase intent, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted (Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt 
2005). Mediated moderation was deemed appropriate since the Label × Positioning interaction 
on purchase intent was significant, and I sought to determine the mediating effect that could 
explain that moderation. Furthermore, given that my theorizing predicted that Label and 
Positioning would have an interactive effect on the mediator (i.e., moral opposition), and the 
above results confirmed this, the appropriate model to run would account for a-path (i.e., front 
end) moderation. Thus, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted using Model 8 in the 
PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013; bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). As predicted, the results 
revealed a significant conditional indirect effect of Positioning on purchase intent through moral 
opposition for the GM-labeled apple (95% CI: .04; .65) but not for the AN-labeled apple (95% 
CI: −.37; .02). 
 
4.2.3   Confound check: Perceived naturalness 
A two-way ANOVA on perceived naturalness once again revealed the expected main 
effect of Label, such that participants perceived the GM-labeled apple to be less natural (M = 
59.90) than the AN-labeled apple (M = 80.74; F(1, 156) = 60.50, p < .001, η2 = .26; see Table 2). 
There was also a main effect of Positioning such that participants perceived the apple to be less 
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natural in the manmade condition (M = 66.36) than in the control condition (M = 74.27; F(1, 
156) = 8.72, p < .005, η2 = .04). Critically, the Label × Positioning interaction was not significant 
(p = .40).  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3   Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 lent support to the first causal pathway of the third hypothesis. 
Specifically, consumers experienced more moral opposition when confronted with a GMO that 
looked like an ordinary apple compared to when its appearance was altered to suggest that it was 
a manmade object. This was consistent with the notion that although people believe that it is 
immoral to tamper with nature (Leyser 2014; Sheehan 2009; Sjöberg 2000; Takala 2004), they 
are not morally opposed to human intervention into manmade objects. Furthermore, a mediated 
moderation analysis revealed that the reduction in moral opposition accounted for the observed 
increase in purchase intent for the GM-labeled food that looked manmade. However, there was 
still the question of whether shutting down the moral response to genetic modification would 
Table 2: Treatment Means and Cell Counts for Study 2 
 AN-Labeled GM-Labeled 
 Control  Manmade Cue Control Manmade Cue 
    
Purchase Intent 04.73c (01.12) 03.94c (01.36) 03.80a (01.33) 04.43a (01.46) 
Moral Opposition 01.38  (0  .59) 01.63 (0  .93) 02.22b (01.29) 01.70b  (0  .79) 
Naturalness  85.82 (13.56) 75.65 (20.51) 62.73 (15.72) 57.07 (17.22) 
Cell Size 40 40 40 40 
 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Means with matching superscripts represent simple 
effects of at least p < .05. 
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impact consumers’ ability to perceive a GM-labeled food’s utilitarian benefits (H3). Study 3 was 
designed with this specific question in mind. 
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Chapter 5 
5   Study 3 
Study 3 was designed to address a number of objectives. First, the manipulations that 
were adopted in the previous studies directly altered how consumers visually perceived the 
product. This made it difficult to disentangle the manmade cue from the product label. Thus, I 
sought to adopt a more indirect means of cuing consumers to reason about the product as either 
natural or manmade. Specifically, I manipulated the context where the GM-labeled food was 
sold. This afforded the benefit of being able to hold the product’s promotional content and 
physical design constant.  
Prior work has demonstrated that store placement can influence consumers’ inferences 
about a product (Baker, Grewal, and Parasuraman 1994; Chandon et al. 2009; Noseworthy, 
Wang, and Islam 2012). The results from this work suggest that seeing a product sold amongst 
natural (manmade) products might increase the likelihood that it would be evaluated as though it 
is natural (manmade). If so, then effects similar to the previous two studies would be expected to 
emerge. This was also substantively relevant given that GMOs are often sold amongst their 
natural counterparts. Based on my theorizing and the results of the previous two studies, I 
predicted that this conventional practice would have a detrimental impact on preference relative 
to when a GM-labeled food is sold amongst manmade products. 
Second, the products in the previous stimuli had all been whole entities (e.g., apples). 
Given that GMOs are also used as ingredients in other products (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015), 
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the stimuli was constructed such that the product of interest had a genetically modified 
ingredient. This enhanced the practical relevance of the study given that more than 70% of 
processed foods in the United States contain genetically modified ingredients (Grocery 
Manufacturers Association 2016). 
Finally, this study was designed to address the initial discussion around the concept of 
perceiving the benefits of a GMO, which I specifically refer to as the utilitarian benefits of the 
product (Voss, Spangenberg, and Grohmann 2003). As discussed, research suggests consumers 
morally oppose genetic modification regardless of any functional benefits that may result from 
such an intervention (Scott et al. 2016). Furthermore, since the moral response to the violation of 
protected values may bias people to reject any potential justifications for the violation (Tetlock 
2002), I predicted that consumers would actually perceive fewer utilitarian benefits in a GMO 
product, but only when the GM-labeled food is positioned as being natural. Conversely, because 
cueing consumers to reason about the GM-labeled food as a manmade object attenuates the 
moral response (as shown in Study 2), moral opposition should no longer inhibit the perception 
of a GMO’s utilitarian benefits. In sum, Study 3 was designed to test H3 and thus, examined 
whether the observed increase in purchase intent when a GMO is promoted as a manmade object 
is accounted for by a decrease in moral opposition and a subsequent increase in perceived 
utilitarian benefits. 
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5.1   Method 
5.1.1   Participants and design 
Three hundred sixteen participants were recruited from a Qualtrics panel to approximate 
the demographic distribution (age and income) of primary household food shoppers in the US. 
Due to attrition, the sample was topped up with participants from MTurk. There were no 
significant differences between the Qualtrics and MTurk results. Participants (71.2% female; 
Mage = 42.5) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Label: GM-labeled vs. 
AN-labeled) × 2 (Positioning: Natural Cue [Produce] vs. Manmade Cue [Energy Drinks]) 
between-subjects factorial design. The goal was to determine whether store placement context 
could alter how consumers see the product (see Appendix E).  
 
5.1.2   Pretest 
Participants (N = 80; 56.3% female; Mage = 34.13) were randomly assigned to view either 
an image of the produce aisle of a store or the energy drink aisle. Then, they evaluated the 
products depicted in the aisle in terms of how manmade or natural they were using the same 
items described in the Study 1 pretest. To confirm that the products were similar in terms of cost, 
participants were also asked to report how much they thought the products in the aisle cost on a 
single item: “Compared to other products sold in a grocery store, how much do the products sold 
in this aisle cost?” (anchored: 1 = not a lot; 9 = a lot). The results revealed that the products sold 
in the energy drink aisle were more comparable to a manmade object (M = 7.88) than to a natural 
object (M = 2.32; F(1, 78) = 95.61, p < .001). Conversely, the products sold in the produce aisle 
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were more comparable to a natural object (M = 6.90) than to a manmade object (M = 4.59; F(1, 
78) = 15.66, p < .001). Thus, this manipulation was adopted as a means of cueing participants to 
reason about the target product as if it were either a manmade or natural product. Furthermore, as 
expected, cost inferences did not differ across contexts (MManmade Cue = 5.73, MNatural Cue = 5.33; p 
= .31). 
 
5.1.3   Procedures and dependent measures  
Participants were first presented with the cover story that General Mills commissioned a 
study to get consumer opinions about a new cereal the company is preparing to launch. Two in-
store contexts were selected because they had similar attributes to cereal (e.g., energy, vitamins, 
etc.), but also differed in the extent to which they were manufactured (manmade) versus natural. 
To that end, energy drinks and fresh produce were selected. These aisles were also chosen 
because they are both novel locations for cereal to be sold. Participants first viewed an image of 
either the energy drink or produce aisle and were asked to evaluate the products in the aisle. 
They were then shown the new (fictional) breakfast cereal being sold on a display in that aisle. In 
the AN-labeled condition, the ad stated that the oats used in the cereal had been grown naturally. 
Conversely, in the GM-labeled condition the ad stated that the oats in the cereal were genetically 
modified. All participants read that the oats consequently contained more vitamin B6 and 
produce high yields without needing fertilizer. Participants then completed an electronic 
questionnaire that consisted of the same purchase intent and perceived naturalness items 
described in Study 1. In an effort to gain more insight into the construct of moral opposition, a 
multi-item scale was adopted to tap the moral response to both the sale and manufacturing of the 
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product (“Selling this product is morally wrong” and “It is morally wrong for General Mills to 
use these oats in their cereal” anchored: 1 = disagree strongly; 7 = agree strongly; Laham et al. 
2009). Lastly, participants were asked to rate the perceived utilitarian benefits of the product on 
five seven-point items (anchored: 1 = ineffective/unhelpful/not 
functional/unnecessary/impractical; 7 = effective/helpful/functional/necessary/practical; Voss et 
al. 2003). The survey concluded with basic demographic questions. 
 
5.2   Results 
5.2.1   Purchase intent 
A two-way ANOVA on purchase intent (α = .96) yielded a significant main effect of 
Label such that purchase intent was higher for the AN-labeled cereal (M = 4.02) compared to the 
GM-labeled cereal (M = 3.33; F(1, 312) = 12.83, p < .001, η2 = .04). The main effect of 
Positioning was not significant (MManmade Cue = 3.76 vs. MNatural Cue = 3.59; p = .39). Critically, the 
main effect of Label was qualified by a significant Label × Positioning interaction (F(1, 312) = 
4.60, p < .05, η2 = .01). As illustrated in Figure 3, simple effects confirmed that purchase intent 
for the GM-labeled cereal was higher when it was viewed amongst manmade products (M = 
3.62) compared to natural products (M = 3.05; F(1, 312) = 4.52, p < .05, η2 = .01). Conversely, 
purchase intent for the AN-labeled cereal did not differ as a result of the aisle it was sold in 
(MManmade Cue = 3.89; MNatural Cue = 4.14, p = .37). The question was whether the placement 
manipulation would reduce moral opposition as in Study 2, and whether this would subsequently 
allow consumers to perceive the product’s utilitarian benefits. 
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5.2.2   Moral opposition 
A two-way ANOVA on moral opposition (r = .82) yielded a significant main effect of 
Label such that participants were more morally opposed to the GM-labeled cereal (M = 2.57) 
than to the AN-labeled cereal (M = 1.65; F(1, 312) = 34.81, p < .001, η2 = .10). There was also a 
significant main effect of Positioning, such that participants were more morally opposed to the 
cereal positioned amongst produce (M = 2.28) versus energy drinks (M = 1.94; F(1, 312) = 4.71, 
p < .05, η2 = .01). As predicted, these main effects were qualified by a significant Label × 
Positioning interaction (F(1, 312) = 8.41, p < .005, η2 = .02). Consistent with my theorizing, 
simple effects confirmed that moral opposition to the GM-labeled cereal was lower when it was 
positioned amongst energy drinks (M = 2.17) rather than produce (M = 2.96; F(1, 312) = 12.85, 
p < .001, η2 = .04). Conversely, moral opposition for the AN-labeled cereal did not differ as a 
result of where it was sold (MManmade Cue = 1.70; MNatural Cue = 1.59, p = .61). This supports the 
notion that no moral violation has taken place in the case of AN-labeled cereal. Next, I sought to 
Figure 3: Purchase intent results for Study 3 
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test whether the reduction in moral opposition towards the GM-labeled cereal allowed consumers 
to perceive its utilitarian benefits. 
 
5.2.3   Utilitarian benefits 
A two-way ANOVA on utilitarian benefits (α = .93) yielded a main effect of Label, such 
that participants perceived greater utilitarian benefits for the AN-labeled cereal (M = 4.67) 
compared to GM-labeled cereal (M = 3.92; F(1, 312) = 29.22, p < .001, η2 = .08). Similar to the 
purchase intent results, the main effect of Positioning was not significant (MManmade Cue = 4.38; 
MNatural Cue = 4.21; p = .22). As predicted, the effect of Label was qualified by a significant Label 
× Positioning interaction (F(1, 312) = 8.79, p < .005, η2 = .03). Simple effects confirmed that the 
GM-labeled cereal was perceived to offer greater utilitarian benefits when it was positioned 
amongst manmade products (M = 4.21) compared to natural products (M = 3.63; F(1, 312) = 
8.75, p < .005, η2 = .03). Conversely, perceived utilitarian benefits of the AN-labeled cereal did 
not differ as a result of where it was sold (MManmade Cue = 4.55; MNatural Cue = 4.79, p = .22). 
Consistent with the notion that consumers do not consider the functional benefits associated with 
GMOs, a complex contrast revealed that participants who viewed the GM-labeled product 
amongst natural products reported the lowest perceived utilitarian benefits compared to a linear 
combination of all other cells (Fψ(3, 312) = 13.16, p < .001, η2 = .11). 
To determine whether a decrease in moral opposition allowed consumers to perceive the 
GM-labeled food’s utilitarian benefits, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted (Hayes 
2013; Model 8; bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). As predicted, the results revealed a significant 
conditional indirect effect of Positioning on utilitarian benefits through moral opposition for the 
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GM-labeled cereal (95% CI: .12; .62) but not for the AN-labeled cereal (95% CI: −.19; .09). To 
test H3, a conditional serial mediation analysis was conducted (Hayes 2013; Model 6 split on 
Label; bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). As predicted, the results revealed that moral opposition 
and perceived utilitarian benefits serially mediated the effect of Positioning on purchase intent 
for those who viewed the GM-labeled cereal (95% CI: .13; .69; see Figure 4) but not for those 
who viewed the AN-labeled cereal (95% CI: −.19; .07).3 
                                                
 
 
3 When running Model 6 for the GM-labelled cereal again with the order of the mediators 
reversed, the analysis did not reveal significant serial mediation (95% CI: −.17; .01). An 
additional analysis was conducted to test for the possibility of parallel mediation across the same 
comparisons used in the serial mediation. Although there was a conditional indirect effect of 
perceived utilitarian benefits (95% CI: .78; 1.16), this was not significant for moral opposition 
(95% CI: −.03; .27). Thus, parallel mediation was not observed and the predicted serial 
mediation model best explained the data. 
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Note: All path coefficients represent unstandardized betas. * p < .05, ** p < .005, and *** p < .001. 
 
 
5.2.4   Confound check: Perceived naturalness 
A two-way ANOVA on perceived naturalness yielded a significant main effect of Label 
such that the GM-labeled cereal was perceived to be less natural (M = 46.62) than the AN-
labeled cereal (M = 69.59; F(1, 311) = 66.10, p < .001, η2 = .17; see Table 3). Neither the main 
effect of Positioning (MManmade Cue = 58.66; MNatural Cue = 57.62; p = .73) nor the Positioning × 
Label interaction were significant (p = .19). 
Figure 4: Serial Mediation Results for Study 3 
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5.3   Discussion 
The results of Study 3 provided additional evidence to suggest that marketing cues can 
reduce the negative response to GM-labeled foods and offered insights into how this can occur. 
Consistent with H3, when consumers viewed the GM-labeled cereal amongst manmade products, 
the moral response to genetic modification was attenuated, which allowed consumers to perceive 
the product’s benefits. This finding was of particular significance given that simply educating 
consumers on the benefits GMOs offer has been demonstrably ineffective at improving attitudes 
towards GMOs (Scholderer and Frewer 2003). Furthermore, although it has been found that 
consumers will explicitly state that they oppose genetic modification regardless of the benefits it 
may offer (Scott et al. 2016), this study offered the first empirical evidence that moral opposition 
impedes consumers’ ability to perceive a GM-labeled food’s benefits. Finally, building on prior 
Table 3:  Treatment Means and Cell Counts for Study 3 
 
 AN-Labeled GM-Labeled 
 Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
    
Purchase intent   4.14 (  1.53) 3.89 (  1.79)   3.05a (  1.74) 3.62a (  1.72) 
Moral opposition 01.59 (   .86) 1.70 (  1.11) 02.96b (  1.94) 2.17b (  1.40) 
Utilitarian benefits    4.79 (  1.09) 4.55 (  1.18)   3.63c (  1.44) 4.21c (  1.19) 
Naturalness   70.95 (18.65) 68.23 (22.65)  44.29 (28.79)   48.97  (28.71) 
Cell size 79 79 79 79 
 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Means with matching superscripts represent simple 
effects of at least p < .05. 
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work showing that violating protected values can colour judgments of the individual who 
commits the immoral act (Tetlock et al. 2000), the results of this study demonstrated that 
consumers’ perceptions of a product can be negatively impacted if that product violates a 
protected value. 
As a final note, it seemed worthwhile to discuss the serial mediation results for the AN-
labeled product. Consistent with Study 2, moral opposition did not activate for the AN-labeled 
product and as predicted, the serial mediation model was not significant for the AN product. 
However, moral opposition did significantly predict perceived utilitarian benefits, which 
subsequently predicted purchase intent (see Figure 4). This makes sense given that moral 
opposition was uniformly low across Positioning conditions and perceived utilitarian benefits 
were relatively high. The utilitarian benefits associated with the AN product were possibly the 
result of participants rationalizing their preference for natural (Rozin et al. 2004). Finally, it is 
not surprising that perceived utilitarian benefits would predict purchase intent. Thus, the results 
for the AN-labeled product depicted in Figure 4 are consistent with what one might expect from 
an ordinary food product. What this study offered was insight into the unique role of moral 
opposition and perceived utilitarian benefits in predicting the acceptability of a GM-labeled food 
and how this is impacted by the way in which the product is positioned.  
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Chapter 6 
6   Study 4 
Collectively, the previous studies demonstrated that the moral response to genetic 
modification will not emerge when consumers are cued to perceive the GM-labeled food as 
manmade. The rationale was that there is nothing morally questionable about humans altering 
manmade products. Thus, embedded in my theorizing was the assumption that the moral 
response to genetic modification is not activating when there is a manmade cue present. This 
assumption was consistent with research showing that moral intuition is a rapid, automatic 
process and that people are dominantly motivated to reason in a manner that is consistent with 
these intuitions (Ditto, Pizzaro, and Tannenbaum 2014; Haidt 2001, 2007). This ultimately 
suggested that the manmade cue increased preference for the GM-labeled product by reducing 
the moral response, rather than leading consumers to correct for the moral response after the fact. 
This study was designed to test this assumption by varying when consumers are exposed to the 
manmade cue. If consumers are first informed that the object is genetically modified, seeing the 
manmade cue after the fact should not attenuate their already activated moral opposition. 
However, if seeing a GM-labeled food as manmade to begin with circumvents moral opposition, 
then preference should be elevated in this condition. 
Finally, due to the nature of the naturalistic field experiment, it was only possible to 
capture a single dependent variable (i.e., product trial). Thus, a pilot study was conducted as a 
means of testing this study design using the same dependent variables as in Study 3 (see 
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Appendix G). The pilot study demonstrated that preference for the GM food was higher when the 
manmade cue was presented before (vs. after) the label. Consistent with Study 3, the increase in 
purchase intent was serially mediated by moral opposition and utilitarian benefits—generalizing 
the effect to a whole GMO as opposed to an ingredient. The question was whether this shift in 
preference would manifest in a naturalistic setting. I followed Gneezy (2017) who argued that a 
true field experiment should involve participants “engaging in activities as they normally would, 
regardless of the experiment” (p. 140). Additionally, consumers should not be aware that the 
experimenter is manipulating factors and measuring behavior (Gneezy 2017). Study 4 was 
designed accordingly. 
 
6.1   Method 
6.1.1   Participants and design 
Three hundred and ninety-eight shoppers were monitored in a small boutique grocery 
store in the Midwestern United States. These shoppers, who were unaware of the experiment, 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Label: GM-labeled vs. AN-labeled) × 2 
(Order: Manmade Cue First vs. Label First) between-subjects factorial design. The product 
selected was plums. The manmade cue was present across all conditions and was in the form of 
product packaging (see Appendix H). 
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6.1.2   Pretest 
Participants from MTurk (N = 40; 77.5% female; Mage = 38.9) were asked to rate the 
packaged plum using the same items described in the Study 1 pretest. The results revealed that 
the packaged plum was indeed more comparable to a manmade object (M = 6.88) than to a 
natural object (M = 4.18; t(1, 39) = 4.37, p < .001). Therefore, this manmade cue was carried 
forward and used in the study. 
 
6.1.3   Procedures and dependent measure 
 A sampling table was ostensibly set up by a fictional company called Pure Plum. The 
product was conveyed as an advanced plum that was naturally grown (genetically modified) to 
possess enhanced cleansing properties. This explicit statement of intent was chosen in order to be 
conservative. Eating or drinking products that are thought to cleanse the body of toxins is a 
common practice engaged in by consumers who are particularly oriented toward buying natural 
products (Thompson and Troester 2002). Thus, the concept of a GM-labeled cleansing product 
should be fairly unappealing to most consumers interested in cleansing. A cleanse product also 
fit well with the grocery store the study was conducted in, since the store sold many organic and 
health-focused products. However, this context would also conservatively bias against the 
predicted results in that many consumers who buy organic foods do so because they are seen as 
natural (Lockie et al. 2004; Onyango et al. 2007). Given that GMOs are perceived to be 
unnatural (Rozin 2005; Rozin et al. 2004), it seemed likely that consumers shopping at this store 
would generally view GMOs unfavourably.  
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Participants were either first shown the packaged plum and then told that the product was 
naturally grown (genetically modified) or they were told that the product was naturally grown 
(genetically modified) and then shown the product. Afterwards, the technician lifted the cover 
off a sampling plate to reveal plum slices and toothpicks and asked if the customer would like to 
sample the product. Whether or not participants agreed to sample the plum served as the core 
dependent variable. Due to the nature of the naturalistic field experiment, participants did not 
complete a questionnaire. Thus, no other dependent variables were captured and no demographic 
information was collected. 
 
6.2   Results and Discussion 
A binary logistic regression on product trial (0 = no trial; 1 = trial) revealed a main effect of 
Label such that participants were less likely to try the GM-labeled product (36%) compared to 
the AN-labeled product (50%; B = −1.30, SE = .30, p < .001, OR = .27). There was also a main 
effect of Order such that participants were less likely to try the plum when the packaging was 
displayed before the label (B = −.61, SE = .29, p < .05, OR = .54). Critically, these main effects 
were qualified by a Label × Order interaction (B = 1.41, SE = .42, p < .005, OR = 4.07; see 
Figure 5). The nature of this interaction was such that participants were about twice as likely to 
try the GM-labeled plum when its packaging was presented before (45%), compared to after 
(27%), the label was conveyed (B = .79, SE = .30, p < .01, OR = 2.21). This was consistent with 
my prediction as well as the pilot study results. Conversely, participants were less likely to try 
the AN-labeled plum when its packaging was presented before (42%), compared to after (58%), 
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the label (B = −.61, SE = .29, p < .05, OR = .54). Although not predicted, it seemed possible that 
the manmade cue (i.e., the packaging) was impacted by the boutique grocery store context, 
leading to an effect of Order for the natural product. This was similar to Study 2 (which was 
conducted at a farmer’s market) where the manmade cue reduced preference for the AN-labeled 
apple. Notably, in the Study 4 pilot study (see Appendix G), which was devoid of context, there 
was no effect of Order for the natural product. This further suggests that the store context may 
explain the observed effect of Order on preference for the natural product. Nevertheless, these 
results (and those from the pilot study) supported the premise that seeing a GMO as manmade 
can reduce consumers’ negative response as long as the manmade cue precedes the label. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5: Product trial results in Study 4 
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Chapter 7 
7   General discussion 
This work is the first to demonstrate that the moral response to genetic modification is 
contingent upon the a priori belief that the product ought to be natural. Specifically, while it has 
been argued that consumers dislike GMOs because they are unnatural (Frewer et al. 1996; 
Tenbült et al. 2005) and therefore, somehow morally wrong (Scott et al. 2016; Takala 2004), the 
results of the current work demonstrate that this is not the case when marketing cues suggest that 
a GM food is manmade. Ultimately, these findings indicate that it may not be unnaturalness per 
se that consumers dislike about GMOs. Instead, it seems that the aversion to GMOs results from 
consumers being unable to view a GMO as anything more than something natural that humans 
have violated. 
The vast majority of packaged food in the USA contains GMOs (Scientific American 
2013). Although firms are not putting consumers at risk by selling these products, consumer 
acceptance remains low (Koch et al. 2015; Nicolia et al. 2014; Saletan 2015). Due to the strong 
movement towards mandatory GMO labeling in the USA, food companies are increasingly 
concerned about the negative implications this will have on sales and have spent millions 
opposing these policies (Ludwig 2013; Moodie 2016). The concern is largely derived from the 
intuitive assumption that consumers will respond negatively to products labeled as containing 
GMOs (Scientific American 2013). Across the studies reported here, I found that there are steps 
firms can take to reduce the likelihood of this outcome. 
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Drawing on research suggesting that the negative consumer response to GMOs is rooted in 
moral values about nature (Bredahl 2001; Frewer et al. 2013; Scott et al. 2016), I predicted and 
found that simple marketing cues can override the moral response to genetic modification. 
Specifically, Study 1 revealed that consumers preferred a GM-labeled food when they were told 
its intended function and an advertisement depicted it packaged like a manmade product. This 
offered initial evidence that the aversion to GMOs is malleable and may not emerge when 
consumers see the product as something humans have created. Study 2 replicated this 
phenomenon and demonstrated that moral opposition to genetic modification was attenuated 
when the GM-labeled food was made to look manmade. This supported the assertion that 
although people believe it is immoral to tamper with nature, they have no such belief about 
manmade objects. Study 2 also employed a control condition, making it possible to test (and 
ultimately supporting) the notion that the manmade cue increases preference for a GM-labeled 
food relative to a control. Study 3 replicated this effect yet again using a subtler placement 
manipulation, and demonstrated that the increase in preference for the GM-labeled food was 
serially mediated by a reduction in moral opposition and a subsequent increase in the product’s 
perceived utilitarian benefits. Study 4 identified a critical moderator, whereby consumers must 
first see the manmade cue before knowing the organism has been modified. 
 
7.1   Theoretical Implications 
This work makes a number of theoretical advancements. First, I demonstrate that the 
moral response to genetic modification is contingent upon the product being viewed as a natural 
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object. As a result, positioning GM foods as manmade can override the moral opposition to 
genetic modification (Bredahl 2001; Frewer et al. 2013; Sjöberg 2000). Drawing on the 
distinction between how people reason about natural and manmade objects, these studies identify 
a novel means of reducing the negative response to genetic modification. By adopting cues to 
suggest that a GM food is manmade, I attenuated moral opposition, and this resulted in 
consumers being more responsive to the product’s listed benefits. Importantly, this finding offers 
new insight to the existing theoretical explanations for why consumers generally dislike GMOs. 
Specifically, it adds an important caveat to the notion that people prefer natural (Rozin 2006; 
Rozin et al. 2004) and have moral values around naturalness (Takala 2004). This dissertation 
demonstrates that this only predicts how consumers will respond to a GM food when they have 
the initial belief that the product is natural. Thus, it appears that consumers’ aversion is not to 
genetic modification per se, but to the idea that humans have fundamentally altered something 
natural. 
These studies also extend prior work on the moral opposition to GMOs by isolating the 
moral barrier to the perception of benefits. Previous work drawing on the protected values 
literature has shown that people weigh the perceived immorality of genetic modification to be 
more important than any potential benefits it may offer (Scott et al. 2016). However, my research 
is the first to show that the moral response to genetic modification manifests as consumers not 
perceiving the GM food’s benefits (see Limitations and Future Research). This therefore lends 
unique insights to and further synthesizes prior work on the moral response to GMOs (Scott et al. 
2016) and protected values (Baron and Spranca 1997). 
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This research also directly contributes to the literature on the preference for natural 
(Rozin et al. 2004; Tenbült et al. 2005). Contrary to the widely held belief that consumers dislike 
GMOs because they are unnatural (Frewer et al. 1996; Rozin 2006; Tenbült et al. 2005), the 
studies reported here demonstrate that preference for a GM food is contingent upon how 
consumers reason about the product, not the degree to which it is seen as natural. In fact, by 
cueing consumers to view the GM food as a manmade object, purchase intent increased despite a 
marked drop in perceived naturalness (relative to the AN-labeled product). This builds on recent 
work exploring how visual changes in product design can enable the acceptance of more 
meaningful unobserved innovations (Noseworthy, Murray, and Di Muro 2018). Furthermore, this 
research is also the first to isolate and confirm the ideational (i.e., moral) underpinning of the 
preference for natural by overcoming methodological limitations inherent in prior work (Rozin 
2006; Rozin et al. 2004). In particular, Rozin and colleagues (2004) concluded that since 
participants preferred a natural alternative despite being told that it was chemically identical to a 
less natural option, natural preference must therefore result from ideational (moral) beliefs since 
chemically identical objects could not reasonably differ in terms of their instrumental properties. 
However, the authors note that this conclusion can only be inferred and a significant limitation of 
the research was that it must be assumed that participants in fact believed that a natural object 
can be chemically identical to its less natural counterpart. Recent evidence does not support this 
assumption (Li and Chapman 2012). By holding the object constant (whether AN-labeled or 
GM-labeled) and altering how people reason about it, the studies presented here were able to 
parse out and isolate the ideational component of natural preference as it applies to GM foods. 
Specifically, I demonstrated that the established relationship between perceived naturalness and 
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acceptability in response to genetic modification (i.e., the drop on both of these measures) only 
holds when the product was viewed as a natural (as opposed to a manmade) object. Consistent 
with the notion that there is nothing inherently immoral about humans altering manmade objects, 
the reduction in moral opposition accounted for the subsequent increase in purchase intentions 
for the GM-labeled food that was positioned as a manmade product. This supported the notion 
that the unacceptability of unnaturalness has an ideational (i.e., moral) basis. 
Finally, these findings also offer theoretical insights into one proposed explanation for 
the negative response to GMOs. Rozin and colleagues (2004) speculated that the aversion to 
human intervention into the food supply may extend from a more general application of the 
contagion principle, which posits that properties can transfer via mere physical contact (Mauss 
2001; Rozin and Nemeroff 1990). The basic idea being that human intervention negatively 
contaminates natural entities (Rozin et al. 2004). Although it was not the goal of this dissertation 
to directly test this premise, the current findings offer some insight in this regard. In particular, 
despite the fact that all of the GM foods across my studies should have been equally 
contaminated in the eyes of participants, I reliably observed that the negative impact of human 
intervention could be attenuated. In particular, my results suggested that human intervention was 
not contaminating when the GM product was positioned as manmade. Thus, it may not be 
contagion per se that makes GM foods unappealing. Instead, it may be a more general negative 
response to the notion of humans violating a natural entity. Nevertheless, given the wealth of 
evidence that contagion impacts consumption (Argo et al. 2006; Di Muro and Noseworthy2013; 
Galoni and Noseworthy 2015; Newman et al. 2011), the notion that contagion may also play a 
  
 
 
62 
role in this context does seem plausible and thus more research is required to further investigate 
the role of contagion in the aversion to GMOs. 
 
7.2   Managerial Implications 
This research offers important insights in light of emerging labeling policies. Although 
many firms will likely be motivated to avoid being associated with GMOs due to the fear of 
stigmatization (Scientific American 2013), there will also be significant costs associated with 
falsely claiming that products are free from GMOs (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015). I show how 
firms can operate in a legislative climate that requires transparency while circumventing 
potentially negative sentiment from the public. Critically, I am not suggesting that firms trick or 
manipulate consumers. Instead, this work shows how firms can provide complete information in 
a way that avoids moral barriers.  
The findings presented here highlight several ways in which marketers can strategically 
respond to calls for transparent GM labeling practices. For example, firms selling GMOs may 
want to alter their ad content to explicitly state why the GM product was altered and to avoid 
conveying the product in a way that could lead consumers to infer that it is natural. Although a 
transparent statement of intent alone may increase preference for a GM food paired with a 
natural cue, Study 1 revealed that people responded most positively to a GM food when it was 
paired with both a manmade cue and a statement of intent. The findings in Study 3 can also 
inform placement strategies. Specifically, it may be advantageous to locate a GM-labeled 
product in an aisle featuring processed foods, and not amongst natural produce. Furthermore, the 
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results of Study 2 spoke to the strategic design of GM foods. For example, it may be 
advantageous for firms to alter a GM fruit’s physical appearance to override the moral response 
to genetic modification. Finally, Study 4 highlighted the strategic importance of ensuring that 
consumers are exposed to the manmade cue prior to learning that the product is a GMO. Given 
that moral responses tend to be automatic (Haidt 2001, 2007), it would be advantageous for 
managers to avoid activating them in the first place. 
The current findings also lend a cautionary note to marketers in light of the recent GM 
food labeling debate (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015). Simply conforming to GM food labeling 
regulations has the potential for negative outcomes. Since GMOs typically look natural or are 
ingredients in products that consumers assume are natural, my results show that merely labeling 
a product as a GMO without incorporating a manmade cue and intent will elicit a negative 
response from consumers. Recall that the negative response to a GM-labeled food was strongest 
when the available cues suggested it was natural. Thus, marketers could adopt the strategic cues 
highlighted in this research to reduce the likelihood that consumers will infer that these GM 
foods are natural.  
Finally, marketers often strive to convey a product’s benefits to consumers and a new 
product’s perceived benefits strongly predict its success in the market (Keller, Heckler, and 
Houston 1998). Furthermore, marketers often segment customers based on the benefits they 
expect from products (Dhalla and Mahatoo 1976; Haley 1968). However, GMOs represent a 
challenge for marketers in that consumers have been shown to be unreceptive to information 
about the benefits of GMOs (Scholderer and Frewer 2003; Scott et al. 2016). Indeed, educating 
consumers about the benefits of GMOs can even backfire, reducing consumers’ likelihood of 
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purchasing these products (Scholderer and Frewer 2003). The current work speaks to this 
directly and identifies how marketers can help consumers to perceive a GMO’s benefits. 
 
7.3   Robustness Check 
A meta-analysis is a widely used statistical technique for compiling and analyzing the 
results from multiple studies that have examined the same phenomenon. However, it can also 
offer a powerful tool for analyzing the studies reported in a single paper (McShane and 
Böckenholt 2017). In contrast to research in many other disciplines, there can never be exact 
replications in behavioural research (Brandt et al. 2014). This can complicate a meta-analysis 
because replications of these types of studies will, at the very least, differ in terms of methods 
factors such as the operationalization of manipulations, the subject pool that the sample is drawn 
from, where the study is conducted, etc. (McShane and Böckenholt 2017). This ultimately results 
in between study variation (i.e., heterogeneity). Recently, a framework for a Single Paper Meta-
analysis (SPM; McShane and Böckenholt 2017) was specifically designed to accommodate the 
heterogeneity resulting from methods factors. Thus, the SPM offers a powerful means of 
assessing an effect revealed through behavioural research. 
In order to assess the robustness of the effect observed across the studies in this 
dissertation, an SPM was conducted. Since the key contrast tested across all studies compared 
the manmade and natural cue conditions for the GM-Labeled product, this was the contrast that 
the SPM was built to analyze. However, due to the variation in the experimental designs used 
across the studies, a number of decisions had to be made when compiling the data for the SPM. 
  
 
 
65 
Recall that Study 1 manipulated whether intent was conveyed, whereas all subsequent studies 
conveyed intent across all conditions. In order to implement a consistent contrast across all 
studies, the Manmade Cue + Intent condition was compared to the Natural Cue + Intent 
condition (for the GM-Labeled product). With regard to Study 4, the field study data could not 
be used because the SPM software can only accommodate dependent variables reported as either 
means or proportions across all studies, not a combination across studies. Thus, I only included 
the Study 4 pilot study (Appendix G), which used a dependent variable that produced mean 
values, which was consistent with the other studies. Furthermore, the Study 4 pilot study had a 
different independent variable (i.e., Order) compared to the other studies. Although the “label 
first” vs. “manmade cue first” conditions are not identical to the manmade and natural cue 
conditions in the other studies, they were conceptually similar in the sense that they manipulated 
whether moral opposition would activate. Thus, the “manmade cue first” condition was treated 
as the “manmade cue” condition, while the “label first” condition was treated as the “natural 
cue” condition. 
 An SPM of these studies estimated the key contrast at .57 (95% CI: .20–.95; see Figure 
6). In order to assess heterogeneity and gain a better understanding of the variation in the 
observations beyond what resulted from the experimental manipulations, an I2 measure was 
generated in the SPM (Higgins et al. 2003). I2 was estimated at 94% (95% CI: 92%–96%), 
suggesting that heterogeneity was very high. Recall that heterogeneity (i.e., between-study 
variation) can be caused by various factors, including the operationalization of experimental 
manipulations, social context, and the subject pool that participants were drawn from (McShane 
and Böckenholt 2017). Thus, the high heterogeneity reported here was not surprising given that 
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the studies in this dissertation were conducted in very different contexts (a lab, in the field, and 
online) and adopted very different Positioning manipulations (packaging, product colour, store 
context). Furthermore, the Order variable in the Study 4 pilot rather loosely mapped onto the 
Positioning independent variable, which would have further contributed to the observed 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the SPM estimate confirmed that the observed effect was robust.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Single Paper Meta-analysis Plot 
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Finally, an additional analysis was conducted in an attempt to accommodate the 
additional study reported in Appendix J. Given the nonsignificant results in the half of the design 
featuring the corn product (presumably because the corn was displayed in a way that was 
problematic and had an unintended effect on the results), only the cereal condition was included 
in the follow up SPM. This was still conservative in that the predicted effect for the cereal 
product was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results estimated the key contrast at 
.55 (95% CI: .15–.95), indicating that it was robust. 
 
7.4   Limitations and Future Research 
Across four studies, I manipulated whether marketing cues indicated that the product was 
natural or manmade. While there was a pure control on the cue condition (re: Study 2), no study 
included a condition where there was no label. This was primarily in order to keep the studies 
balanced in terms of the amount and style of information conveyed. However, the notion of 
something being “all natural” would seemingly come with its own set of inferences. 
Nevertheless, my data suggests that in the absence of a label to the contrary, most consumers 
believe food products are natural. This may explain why GMO labeling is so contentious. It 
would be interesting for future research to investigate whether there are unanticipated effects of 
AN-labeling on consumer preference. For example, if a product is noted as AN and a 
neighbouring product is not, it is possible that consumers will infer that the neighbouring product 
is less natural, less healthy, more affordable, etc. 
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An unanticipated finding in Study 3 was that utilitarian benefits were higher for the AN-
labeled product. Based on Rozin and colleagues’ work (2004), it seems that this may be 
indicative of consumers rationalizing their preference for natural foods by expressing beliefs 
about its functional superiority (e.g., natural is healthier). It is also possible that functional 
concerns surrounding a GM-labeled food may arise for some products even when moral 
opposition is not activated. Despite there being little evidence to suggest that GMOs have a 
negative impact on consumers, continued politicization could lead to the general fear that GMOs 
may do more harm than good.  
In my studies, consumer preference for GMOs with various intended functions (e.g., 
rehydration, reduced pesticides, augmented vitamin content, and cleansing) was explored. 
However, this is by no means an exhaustive test of all potential GMO functions and did not 
address whether some functions are more appealing than others. Furthermore, by definition, a 
GM ingredient constitutes an augmentation or addition to what is technically a manmade object 
(e.g., the cereal in Study 3). This raised the question of whether a GM food would be more 
acceptable as an ingredient in a manmade product (relative to a whole object) given that this kind 
of product could seem relatively more manmade, potentially making it easier to override moral 
opposition. An additional study was conducted to test this (see Appendix J). However, due to 
some shortcomings in the study, the results remain inconclusive. In the end, this question may be 
of little importance given that my effect was observed for both whole (e.g., apples) and 
processed foods (e.g., cereal). 
In this work, I purposively varied the brands across studies. The brands used varied in 
terms of whether they were real (e.g., Nike) or fictional (e.g. Pure Plum). Given that the 
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predicted effects emerged regardless of whether the target product was made by a real or 
fictional brand, this ultimately lent support for the robustness of the effect. This doesn’t suggest 
that branding is irrelevant, but simply that it was less impactful relative to the other cues I was 
implementing. Nevertheless, it would be interesting for future research to further investigate the 
possibility that different brands may be more or less successful in introducing a GM food 
product. For example, findings from prior research raise the possibility that dominant brands 
may be better able to launch GM food products (Bagga, Noseworthy, and Dawar 2016).  
It is also worth noting that it was never formally predicted that the Positioning cue would 
have an effect on perceived naturalness. Although some movement was expected (particularly 
when changing the actual color of a product), there was nothing in the literature to suggest that 
such cues could override an explicit label stating the object is all natural. That said, there was 
movement in three studies, but this did not influence the predicted results in so much as there 
were no interactions to suggest that perceptions of naturalness could account for preference. 
In this dissertation, I did not manipulate who was responsible for producing the product. 
The products used in my studies were generally conveyed in such a way that marketer 
involvement was rather salient (Study 2 may be an exception). For instance, the target products 
were presented in advertisements, in a store aisle, etc. Additionally, the statement of intent could 
have been perceived as a marketer’s intent for the product. However, it is possible that the 
response to a GMO may vary depending on what kind of professional is associated with it. 
Recent polls indicate that 42% of consumers distrust brands and 69% distrust advertising (Tenzer 
and Chalmers 2015). Furthermore, consumers are particularly sensitive to deceptive practices by 
marketers and this can have broad negative implications even for non-offending firms (Darke, 
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Ashworth, and Main 2010; Darke, Ashworth, and Ritchie 2008; Darke and Ritchie 2007). Thus, 
consumers may be especially weary of marketers intervening and altering natural objects. This 
ultimately suggests that the studies reported here were rather conservative in that participants 
could have responded more negatively towards the GM-labeled products due to marketing’s 
involvement. Conversely, given that 40% of Americans report that they have a great deal of 
confidence in the scientific community (Funk and Kennedy 2017), perhaps the negative response 
to a GM-labeled food would be relatively lower when it is framed as something produced by 
scientists as opposed to marketers. However, based on my theorizing, I would predict that the 
profession associated with a GM food should not matter. Generally speaking, people believe it is 
immoral to “play God” and tamper with nature (Sjöberg 2000; Takala 2004). Furthermore, if a 
protected value is relevant (Scott et al. 2016), then people should expect unconditional adherence 
to that value regardless of the profession one works in. Collectively, this suggests that the 
identity of the agent engaging in this behaviour will not impact consumers’ response.  
As previously mentioned, this work is the first to show that the moral response to genetic 
modification overrides the perception of the GMO’s benefits. Although I demonstrated that this 
is the process that accounts for the higher purchase intentions for a GM-labeled food positioned 
as being manmade, I did not directly test the underlying process for the relationship between 
moral opposition and perceived utilitarian benefits. I reasoned that the reduction in perceived 
benefits would result from a tendency to reject potential justifications for the violation of a 
protected value (Tetlock 2002). Thus, people may be negatively biased against the notion that 
something they are morally opposed to has any beneficial properties. It would be interesting for 
  
 
 
71 
future research to further investigate the process by which moral opposition impacts subsequent 
judgments, including the perception of benefits.  
Recently, firms have expanded the use of genetic engineering beyond food crops to 
include non-food applications such as trees. For example, trees have been genetically modified to 
grow faster and resist pests (The Economist 2013). Currently, there is scant research on how 
consumers respond to non-food products that are genetically modified. The dominant focus on 
food is likely due to the extensive use of GMOs in food and consumers’ often vocal response to 
these products. Given that people exhibit a general affinity for nature that extends to non-food 
objects (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989; Kellert 2011; Kellert and Wilson 1993; Wilson 1984), it 
seems likely that the genetic modification of non-food products would elicit a similar moral 
response from consumers. However, this is an empirical question and more research is required 
to determine whether manmade cues can also reduce the moral response to genetic modification 
in non-food products as well. 
 
7.5   Extending this Research 
One potential extension of this work could be into the domain of “ugly produce”, which 
is a term that refers to fresh fruits and vegetables that have physical imperfections. Research has 
shown that the way a food looks has an important influence on consumers’ preferences (Bunn et 
al. 1990; de Hooge et al. 2017; Loebnitz, Schuitema, and Grunert 2015). In particular, Leobnitz 
and colleagues (2015) found that consumers were less willing to purchase fruits and vegetables 
that were abnormally shaped. While prior work has dominantly investigated how physical 
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features such as ripeness (Symmank, Zahn, and Rohm 2018) and blemishes (Bunn et al. 1990) 
impact preference, little is known about why consumers respond negatively to fruits and 
vegetables with an atypical form. Furthermore, the literature on suboptimal produce has been 
largely descriptive, demonstrating that consumers dislike these products as opposed to 
investigating why this is the case (Bunn et al. 1990; Loebnitz et al. 2015; Yue et al. 2007). 
 Misshapen produce seemed an interesting and relevant domain to extend my findings to 
for a number of reasons. First, similar to GM foods, it seemed plausible that the aversion to these 
products resulted from essentialist reasoning. In particular, if people tend to infer a causal 
relationship between a natural object’s surface level properties and its underlying essence 
(Gelman 2003; Medin 1989), observing a form violation may lead consumers to question the 
object’s category membership. This would also be consistent with research showing that people 
draw on natural objects’ appearance as a diagnostic cue of their unobservable properties (Rehder 
and Kim 2009). Thus, it seemed possible that drawing on similar theory could lend predictions 
for cues that could augment preference for these products. 
This potential extension was also interesting from a practical standpoint in that 
consumers’ aversion to imperfect foods is a major contributor to food waste (Aschemann-Witzel 
et al. 2017; Buzby et al. 2011; Buzby and Hyman 2012). Aside from issues related to world 
hunger, the fact that food production accounts for nearly a third of all greenhouse gas emissions  
further highlights the significant negative impact of food waste (Garnett 2011). Thus, 
establishing a better understanding of the psychological basis for the aversion to atypical produce 
could offer both theoretical insights as well as practical implications for marketers and policy 
makers.  
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While prior work has dominantly investigated how physical features such as ripeness 
(Symmank et al. 2018) and blemishes (Bunn et al. 1990) impact preference, much less is known 
about why consumers respond negatively to produce with an atypical form. This also seemed 
more interesting given that it is quite intuitive that consumers would dislike food that appears as 
though it may be rotting or is overly ripe. In sum, I wanted to investigate whether I could reduce 
or even erase the negative response to form violations in produce. Drawing on a line of reasoning 
similar to what I have applied to GMOs, I predicted that adopting cues that would suggest either 
an intact or novel essential structure would elicit a more positive response to produce that has an 
atypical form.  
I reasoned that cueing consumers to infer an essence that was distinct from what they 
might automatically expect could increase preference for a misshaped fruit. For example, when 
confronted with an atypically shaped apple, learning that it is a “Caledonian apple” (a fictional 
label) might increase preference because it would cue the consumer to draw less heavily on their 
established schema for an apple and simply infer a different essence. While this cue did 
significantly increase preference for the apple, participants still liked the apple with an atypical 
form less than its typical counterpart. Thus, the cue was not able to completely eliminate the drop 
in preference. One explanation could be that people were still drawing on their broader schema 
for an apple, which would make sense given that they were told that the product was another 
kind of apple. It is possible that referring to the atypical fruit as something entirely novel (e.g., 
narm fruit) could completely erase the drop in evaluations. However, this would have limited 
applicability to marketing. Another approach could be to add an AN-label to atypical produce, 
given the well established preference for natural (Rozin 2005; Rozin et al. 2004). For example, 
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the Canadian grocer Loblaws sells “naturally imperfect” produce. This is an interesting strategy 
because my data suggests people perceive atypically shaped produce as less natural. Future 
research could explore what inferences consumers make when faced with imperfectly shaped 
produce that is positioned as being natural, and whether this is in fact an effective way to 
position these foods. 
In the end, boosting preference for these products proved rather difficult and I did not 
find evidence to suggest that the aversion to misshapen produce could be entirely eliminated. 
One potential reason for this may be due to the innate disgust response people experience when 
confronted with potentially spoiled foods (Haidt et al. 1997; Rozin and Fallon 1987). 
Furthermore, even if people do not necessarily infer that the food is spoiled, the food may be 
avoided due to the magical belief that “you are what you eat” (Rozin and Fallon 1987). Thus, it 
could be that even if the product simply seems flawed in some respect, consumers may be averse 
to it due to the implicit notion that they too may become flawed if they were to consume it. 
 
7.6   Concluding Remarks 
The production and sale of GM foods remains a controversial matter (Leyser 2014; 
McWilliams 2015; Miller and Conko 2004; Saletan 2015). It is worth noting that although this 
dissertation does not argue for the safety, efficacy, or desirability of GM foods, it does draw on 
mounting evidence that the aversion and opposition to GM foods may be unwarranted (Koch et 
al. 2015; National Academies of Sciences 2016; Nicolia et al. 2014; Qaim and Kouser 2013). In 
particular, recent reviews of published studies from the past decade or more found that there is 
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no discernable difference in health outcomes between populations of humans or livestock based 
on whether they consume GM foods (National Academies of Sciences 2016; Nicolia et al. 2014). 
However, this does not account for the potential environmental implications of cultivating GM 
crops, including cross-pollination, for example. Furthermore, one can consider consumers’ 
aversion to GM foods rational if consumers have adopted the view that these products are 
harmful in some way. That is, disliking GM foods would be a reasonable response to the premise 
that they are harmful (even if this premise is not supported by the extant research). 
Given the nature of the findings reported here, one natural question that arises is: what if 
the negative response to genetic modification is warranted? While this is possible, perhaps more 
interesting is the fact that the negative response to genetic modification appears to be insensitive 
to evidence in the sense that many consumers oppose GMOs despite having very little 
knowledge about genetic modification (Gaskell et al. 1999; Hallman, Cuite, and Morin 2013). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that when educated about GMOs, consumers’ attitudes remain 
unchanged and purchase intentions are actually reduced (Scholderer and Frewer 2003). The 
aversion to GMOs also seems rather arbitrary. As Rozin (2006) points out, if people feel that 
altering the DNA of natural objects is immoral, they should also be strongly opposed to 
domestication and selective breeding, which alters far more genetic material than genetic 
engineering does. However, selective breeding has been used for centuries and consumers appear 
to be entirely accepting of this practice. Thus, if the moral response to human intervention into 
natural objects is both insensitive to evidence and arbitrary, it could be argued that there is 
something to be gained by facilitating consumers’ ability to consider all relevant information 
when evaluating GMOs.  
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The debate surrounding how GM foods are sold and the implications thereof are also 
undoubtedly complex. In fact, despite the intuitive notion that labeling policies increase 
consumers’ ability to choose what they buy, it has been argued that GMO labeling policies 
ultimately impede consumer choice because firms subsequently avoid GMO ingredients 
(Scientific American 2013). Furthermore, mandatory GM food labeling could also impose severe 
costs on consumers, given that reverting to non-GM foods would increase food prices by 10 to 
50% (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015). By adopting the strategies outlined in this work, marketers 
can more confidently offer consumers the opportunity to choose GM foods, whether they wish to 
do so for the more desirable price, the reduced need for pesticide use, or because the GM food is 
healthier. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
77 
References 
Ahn, Woo-kyoung (1998), “Why Are Different Features Central for Natural Kinds and 
Artifacts?: The Role of Causal Status in Determining Feature Centrality,” Cognition, 
69(2), 135–78. 
Ahn, Woo-kyoung, Susan A. Gelman, Jennifer A. Amsterlaw, Jill Hohenstein, and Charles W. 
Kalish (2000), “Causal Status Effect in Children’s Categorization,” Cognition, 76(2), 
B35–43. 
Ahn, Woo-kyoung, N. S. Kim, M. E. Lassaline, and M. J. Dennis (2000), “Causal Status as a 
Determinant of Feature Centrality,” Cognitive Psychology, 41(4), 361–416. 
Ames, Bruce N., Margie Profet, and Lois S. Gold (1990), “Dietary Pesticides (99.99% All 
Natural),” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 87(19), 7777–81. 
Argo, Jennifer J., Darren W. Dahl, and Andrea C. Morales (2006), “Consumer Contamination: 
How Consumers React to Products Touched by Others,” Journal of Marketing, 70(2), 
81–94. 
——— (2008), “Positive Consumer Contagion: Responses to Attractive Others in a Retail 
Context,” Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), 690–701. 
Aschemann-Witzel, Jessica, Jacob Haagen Jensen, Mette Hyldetoft Jensen, and Viktorija 
Kulikovskaja (2017), “Consumer Behaviour towards Price-Reduced Suboptimal Foods in 
  
 
 
78 
the Supermarket and the Relation to Food Waste in Households,” Appetite, 
116(Supplement C), 246–58. 
Bagga, Charan K., Theodore J. Noseworthy, and Niraj Dawar (2016), “Asymmetric 
Consequences of Radical Innovations on Category Representations of Competing 
Brands,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 26(1), 29–39. 
Baker, Julie, Dhruv Grewal, and A. Parasuraman (1994), “The Influence of Store Environment 
on Quality Inferences and Store Image,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
22(4), 328–39. 
Baron, Jonathan and Mark Spranca (1997), “Protected Values,” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 70(1), 1–16. 
Barrett, H. Clark, Stephen Laurence, and Eric Margolis (2008), “Artifacts and Original Intent: A 
Cross-Cultural Perspective on the Design Stance,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 
8(1), 1–22. 
Barton, Michelle E. and Lloyd K. Komatsu (1989), “Defining Features of Natural Kinds and 
Artifacts,” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 18(5), 433–47. 
Berman, Marc G., John Jonides, and Stephen Kaplan (2008), “The Cognitive Benefits of 
Interacting With Nature,” Psychological Science, 19(12), 1207–12. 
Berto, Rita (2005), “Exposure to Restorative Environments Helps Restore Attentional Capacity,” 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 25(3), 249–59. 
  
 
 
79 
Bloom, Paul (1996), “Intention, History, and Artifact Concepts,” Cognition, 60(1), 1–29. 
——— (2007), “More than Words: A Reply to Malt and Sloman,” Cognition, 105(3), 649–55. 
——— (1998), “Theories of Artifact Categorization,” Cognition, 66(1), 87–93. 
Brandt, Mark J., Hans IJzerman, Ap Dijksterhuis, Frank J. Farach, Jason Geller, Roger Giner-
Sorolla, James A. Grange, Marco Perugini, Spies Spies, and Anna vant Veer (2014), 
“The Replication Recipe: What makes for a convincing replication?,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 217–24. 
Bredahl, Lone (2001), “Determinants of Consumer Attitudes and Purchase Intentions With 
Regard to Genetically Modified Food – Results of a Cross-National Survey,” Journal of 
Consumer Policy, 24(1), 23–61. 
Bunn, D., G.W. Feenstra, Lori Lynch, and Robert Sommer (1990), “Consumer Acceptance of 
Cosmetically Imperfect Produce,” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 24(2), 268. 
Buzby, Jean C. and Jeffrey Hyman (2012), “Total and per Capita Value of Food Loss in the 
United States,” Food Policy, 37(5), 561–70. 
Buzby, Jean C., Jeffrey Hyman, Hayden Stewart, and Hodan F. Wells (2011), “The Value of 
Retail- and Consumer-Level Fruit and Vegetable Losses in the United States,” The 
Journal of Consumer Affairs, 45(3), 492. 
  
 
 
80 
Cafaro, Philip and Richard Primack (2014), “Species Extinction Is a Great Moral Wrong,” 
Biological Conservation, 170, 1–2. 
Carpenter, Janet E. (2010), “Peer-Reviewed Surveys Indicate Positive Impact of Commercialized 
GM Crops,” Nature Biotechnology, 28(4), 319–21. 
Caswell, Julie A. and Daniel I. Padberg (1992), “Toward a More Comprehensive Theory of Food 
Labels,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(2), 460–68. 
Chaigneau, Sergio E., Ramón D. Castillo, and Luis Martínez (2008), “Creators’ Intentions Bias 
Judgments of Function Independently from Causal Inferences,” Cognition, 109(1), 123–
32. 
Chandon, Pierre, J. Wesley Hutchinson, Eric T. Bradlow, and Scott H. Young (2009), “Does In-
Store Marketing Work? Effects of the Number and Position of Shelf Facings on Brand 
Attention and Evaluation at the Point of Purchase,” Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 1–17. 
Chassy, Bruce and John Entine (2015), “Although Some GMO Sympathizers Embrace 
Mandatory Labeling, It’s A Disaster In Waiting,” Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-entine/although-some-gmo-
sympath_b_8864038.html. 
Chassy, Bruce and Jon Entine (2015), “The Real Cost Of Mandatory GMO Labeling,” The 
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-entine/the-real-cost-of-
mandator_b_8865742.html. 
  
 
 
81 
Chattopadhyay, Amitava and Kunal Basu (1990), “Humor in Advertising: The Moderating Role 
of Prior Brand Evaluation,” Journal of Marketing Research, 27(4), 466–76. 
Consumer Reports (2015), “Consumers Want Mandatory Labeling for GMO Foods,” Consumer 
Reports, http://www.consumerreports.org/food-safety/consumers-want-mandatory-
labeling-for-gmo-foods/. 
Darke, Peter, Laurence Ashworth, and Kelley Main (2010), “Great Expectations and Broken 
Promises: Misleading Claims, Product Failure, Expectancy Disconfirmation and 
Consumer Distrust,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(3), 347–62. 
Darke, Peter R., Laurence Ashworth, and Robin J. B. Ritchie (2008), “Damage from Corrective 
Advertising: Causes and Cures,” Journal of Marketing, 72(6), 81–97. 
Darke, Peter R and Robin J.B Ritchie (2007), “The Defensive Consumer: Advertising Deception, 
Defensive Processing, and Distrust,” Journal of Marketing Research, 44(1), 114–27. 
Dennett, Daniel Clement (1987), The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Dhalla, Nariman K. and Winston H. Mahatoo (1976), “Expanding the Scope of Segmentation 
Research,” Journal of Marketing, 40(2), 34–41. 
Di Muro, Fabrizio and Theodore J. Noseworthy (2013), “Money Isn't Everything, but It Helps If 
It Doesn't Look Used: How the Physical Appearance of Money Influences Spending,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 39 (6), 1330-1342. 
  
 
 
82 
Diesendruck, Gil and Susan A. Gelman (1999), “Domain Differences in Absolute Judgments of 
Category Membership: Evidence for an Essentialist Account of Categorization,” 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(2), 338–46. 
Ditto, Peter H., David A. Pizzaro, and David Tannenbaum (2014), “Motivated Moral 
Reasoning,” in Moral Judgment and Decision Making, ed. Daniel M. Bartels, Christopher 
W. Bauman, Fiery Cushman, David A. Pizarro, and A. Peter McGraw, Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 307–38. 
Dreezens, Ellen, Carolien Martijn, Petra Tenbült, Gerjo Kok, and Nanne K. de Vries (2005), 
“Food and Values: An Examination of Values Underlying Attitudes toward Genetically 
Modified- and Organically Grown Food Products,” Appetite, 44(1), 115–22. 
Dugas, J. (2006), “Sodium Ingestion and Hyponatraemia: Sports Drinks Do Not Prevent a Fall in 
Serum Sodium Concentration during Exercise,” British Journal of Sports Medicine, 
40(4), 372–372. 
Estes, Zachary (2004), “Confidence and Gradedness in Semantic Categorization: Definitely 
Somewhat Artifactual, Maybe Absolutely Natural,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
11(6), 1041–47. 
——— (2003), “Domain Differences in the Structure of Artifactual and Natural Categories,” 
Memory & Cognition, 31(2), 199–214. 
  
 
 
83 
Fiske, Alan P. and Philip E. Tetlock (1997), “Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That 
Transgress the Spheres of Justice,” Political Psychology, 18(2), 255–97. 
Food and Drug Administration (1993), “Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General 
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the 
Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food,” 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-06/pdf/FR-1993-01-06.pdf. 
Frech, Warren A. and Hiram C. Barksdale (1974), “Food Labeling Regulations: Efforts Toward 
Full Disclosure,” Journal of Marketing, 38(3), 14–19. 
Frewer, Lynn J., C Howard, and R Shepherd (1996), “The Influence of Realistic Product 
Exposure on Attitudes towards Genetic Engineering of Food,” Food Quality and 
Preference, 7(1), 61–67. 
Frewer, Lynn J., Ivo A. van der Lans, Arnout R.H. Fischer, Machiel J. Reinders, Davide 
Menozzi, Xiaoyong Zhang, Isabelle van den Berg, and Karin L. Zimmermann (2013), 
“Public Perceptions of Agri-Food Applications of Genetic Modification – A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis,” Trends in Food Science & Technology, 30(2), 142–52. 
Funk, Cary and Brian Kennedy (2017), “Public Confidence in Scientists Has Remained Stable 
for Decades,” Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/06/public-confidence-in-scientists-has-remained-stable-for-decades/. 
  
 
 
84 
Galoni, Chelsea and Theodore J. Noseworthy (2015), “Does Dirty Money Influence Product 
Valuations?,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 25(2), 304–10. 
Garnett, Tara (2011), “Where Are the Best Opportunities for Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in the Food System (Including the Food Chain)?,” Food Policy, 
36(Supplement 1), S23–32. 
Gaskell, George, Martin W. Bauer, John Durant, and Nicholas C. Allum (1999), “Worlds Apart? 
The Reception of Genetically Modified Foods in Europe and the U.S.,” Science, 
285(5426), 384–87. 
Gelman, Susan A. (2003), The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought, 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gelman, Susan A. and Paul Bloom (2000), “Young Children Are Sensitive to How an Object 
Was Created When Deciding What to Name It,” Cognition, 76(2), 91–103. 
Gelman, Susan A. and Charles W. Kalish (1993), “Categories and Causality,” in Emerging 
Themes in Cognitive Development, New York: Springer-Verlag, 3–32. 
Gneezy, Ayelet (2017), “Field Experimentation in Marketing Research,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 54(1), 140–43. 
Gold, Lois, Thomas H. Slone, and Bruce N. Ames (2001), “Natural and Synthetic Chemicals in 
the Diet: A Critical Analysis of Possible Cancer Hazards.,” in Food Safety and Food 
Quality: Issues in Environmental Science and Technology, ed. R. E. Hester and R. M. 
  
 
 
85 
Harrison, Cambridge, UK: Royal Society of Chemistry, 95–128, 
https://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cpdb/pdfs/handbook.pesticide.toxicology.pdf. 
Govindasamy, Ramu and John Italia (1999), “Predicting Willingness-to-Pay a Premium for 
Organically Grown Fresh Produce,” Journal of Food Distribution Research, 30(2), 
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/agsjlofdr/27385.htm. 
Grocery Manufacturers Association (2016), “Grocery Manufacturers Association Position on 
GMOs,” The Facts About GMO, https://factsaboutgmos.org/disclosure-statement. 
Gunther, Marc (2014), “GMO 2.0: Genetically Modified Foods with Added Health Benefits,” 
The Guardian, June 10, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2014/jun/10/genetically-modified-foods-health-benefits-soybean-potatoes. 
Gutheil, Grant, Paul Bloom, Nohemy Valderrama, and Rebecca Freedman (2004), “The Role of 
Historical Intuitions in Children’s and Adults’ Naming of Artifacts,” Cognition, 91(1), 
23–42. 
Haidt, Jonathan (2001), “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment.,” Psychological review, 108(4), 814. 
——— (2007), “The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology,” Science, 316(5827), 998–1002. 
Haidt, Jonathan, Paul Rozin, Clark Mccauley, and Sumio Imada (1997), “Body, Psyche, and 
Culture: The Relationship between Disgust and Morality,” Psychology and Developing 
Societies, 9(1), 107–31. 
  
 
 
86 
Haley, Russell I. (1968), “Benefit Segmentation: A Decision-Oriented Research Tool,” Journal 
of Marketing, 32(3), 30–35. 
Hall, D. G. (1995), “Artifacts and Origins,” Unpublished manuscript. 
Hallman, William K., Cara L. Cuite, and Xenia K. Morin (2013), “Public Perceptions of 
Labeling Genetically Modified Foods,” 
http://humeco.rutgers.edu/documents_pdf/news/gmlabelingperceptions.pdf. 
Hamblin, James (2015), “No One Is Denying a ‘Right to Know What’s in My Food,’” The 
Atlantic, July 24, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/07/no-one-is-denying-
a-right-to-know-whats-in-my-food/399536/. 
Hampton, James A., Gert Storms, Claire L. Simmons, and Daniel Heussen (2009), “Feature 
Integration in Natural Language Concepts,” Memory & Cognition, 37(8), 1150–63. 
Harmon, Amy (2013), “Golden Rice: Lifesaver?,” The New York Times, August 24, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/sunday-review/golden-rice-lifesaver.html. 
Haws, Kelly L. and Karen Page Winterich (2013), “When Value Trumps Health in a Supersized 
World,” Journal of Marketing, 77(3), 48–64. 
Hayes, Andrew F. (2013), Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach, Guilford Press. 
  
 
 
87 
Higgins, Julian P. T., Simon G. Thompson, Jonathan J. Deeks, and Douglas G. Altman (2003), 
“Measuring Inconsistency in Meta-Analyses,” British Medical Journal, 327(7414), 557–
60. 
Hingston, Sean T., Justin F. McManus, and Theodore J. Noseworthy (2017), “How Inferred 
Contagion Biases Dispositional Judgments of Others,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
27(2), 195–206. 
de Hooge, Ilona E., Marije Oostindjer, Jessica Aschemann-Witzel, Anne Normann, Simone 
Mueller Loose, and Valérie Lengard Almli (2017), “This Apple Is Too Ugly for Me!: 
Consumer Preferences for Suboptimal Food Products in the Supermarket and at Home,” 
Food Quality and Preference, 56(Part A), 80–92. 
ISAAA (2016), Biotech Crop Highlights in 2015, 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/16/. 
Juma, Calestous (2011), “Preventing Hunger: Biotechnology Is Key,” Nature, 479(7374), 471–
72. 
Kaplan, Rachel and Stephen Kaplan (1989), The Experience of Nature: A Psychological 
Perspective, CUP Archive. 
Keil, Frank C. (1989), Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development, MIT Press. 
  
 
 
88 
Kelemen, Deborah, Joshua Rottman, and Rebecca Seston (2013), “Professional Physical 
Scientists Display Tenacious Teleological Tendencies: Purpose-Based Reasoning as a 
Cognitive Default.,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1074–83. 
Keller, Kevin Lane, Susan E. Heckler, and Michael J. Houston (1998), “The Effects of Brand 
Name Suggestiveness on Advertising Recall,” Journal of Marketing, 62(1), 48–57. 
Kellert, Stephen R. (2011), “Dimensions, Elements, and Attributes of Biophilic Design.,” in 
Biophilic Design: The Theory, Science and Practice of Bringing Buildings to Life, ed. 
Stephen R. Kellert, Judith H. Heerwagen, and Martin L. Mador, John Wiley & Sons, 3–
19. 
Kellert, Stephen R. and Edward O. Wilson (1993), The Biophilia Hypothesis, Island Press. 
Kelter, Stephanie, Holger Grötzbach, Ralf Freiheit, Barbara Höhle, Sabine Wutzig, and Eugen 
Diesch (1984), “Object Identification: The Mental Representation of Physical and 
Conceptual Attributes,” Memory & Cognition, 12(2), 123–33. 
Koch, Michael S., Jason M. Ward, Steven L. Levine, James A. Baum, John L. Vicini, and Bruce 
G. Hammond (2015), “The Food and Environmental Safety of Bt Crops,” Frontiers in 
Plant Science, 6, 283. 
Kramer, Thomas and Lauren G. Block (2014), “Like Mike: Ability Contagion through Touched 
Objects Increases Confidence and Improves Performance,” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 124(2), 215–28. 
  
 
 
89 
Laham, Simon M., Adam L. Alter, and Geoffrey P. Goodwin (2009), “Easy on the Mind, Easy 
on the Wrongdoer: Discrepantly Fluent Violations Are Deemed Less Morally Wrong,” 
Cognition, 112(3), 462–66. 
Lee, Charles, Sally A. Linkenauger, Jonathan Z. Bakdash, Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba, and Dennis R. 
Profitt (2011), “Putting like a pro: The Role of Positive Contagion in Golf Performance 
and Perception.,” PLoS One, 6(10), e26016. 
Leyser, Ottoline (2014), “Moving beyond the GM Debate,” PLOS Biology, 12(6), e1001887. 
Li, Meng and Gretchen B. Chapman (2012), “Why Do People Like Natural? Instrumental and 
Ideational Bases for the Naturalness Preference,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
42(12), 2859–78. 
Lockie, Stewart, Kristen Lyons, Geoffrey Lawrence, and Janet Grice (2004), “Choosing 
Organics: A Path Analysis of Factors Underlying the Selection of Organic Food among 
Australian Consumers,” Appetite, 43(2), 135–46. 
Loebnitz, Natascha, Geertje Schuitema, and Klaus G. Grunert (2015), “Who Buys Oddly Shaped 
Food and Why? Impacts of Food Shape Abnormality and Organic Labeling on Purchase 
Intentions,” Psychology & Marketing, 32(4), 408–21. 
Ludwig, Mike (2013), “Food Companies and Monsanto Spend Millions to Defeat Washington 
GMO Labeling Initiative,” Truthout, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/19698. 
  
 
 
90 
Ma, Yu, Kusum L Ailawadi, and Dhruv Grewal (2013), “Soda Versus Cereal and Sugar Versus 
Fat: Drivers of Healthful Food Intake and the Impact of Diabetes Diagnosis,” Journal of 
Marketing, 77(3), 101–20. 
Malt, Barbara C. and Eric C. Johnson (1998), “Artifact Category Membership and the 
Intentional-Historical Theory,” Cognition, 66(1), 79–85. 
——— (1992), “Do Artifact Concepts Have Cores?,” Journal of memory and language, 31(2), 
195–217. 
Mao, Gen-Xiang, Yong-Bao Cao, Xiao-Guang Lan, Zhi-Hua He, Zhuo-Mei Chen, Ya-Zhen 
Wang, Xi-Lian Hu, Yuan-Dong Lv, Guo-Fu Wang, and Jing Yan (2012), “Therapeutic 
Effect of Forest Bathing on Human Hypertension in the Elderly,” Journal of Cardiology, 
60(6), 495–502. 
Margolis, Eric and Stephen Laurence, Eds. (2007), “Creations of the Mind Theories of Artifacts 
and Their Representation,” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Matan, Adee and Susan Carey (2001), “Developmental Changes within the Core of Artifact 
Concepts,” Cognition, 78(1), 1–26. 
Mauss, Marcel (2001), A General Theory of Magic, Psychology Press. 
McShane, Blakeley B. and Ulf Böckenholt (2017), “Single-Paper Meta-Analysis: Benefits for 
Study Summary, Theory Testing, and Replicability,” Journal of Consumer Research, 
43(6), 1048–63. 
  
 
 
91 
McWilliams, James (2015), “‘Ban GMOs: That Shit Ain’t Food,’” Pacific Standard, 
https://psmag.com/ban-gmos-that-shit-ain-t-food-9c8eba454a83. 
Medin, Douglas L. (1989), “Concepts and Conceptual Structure.,” American psychologist, 
44(12), 1469. 
Medin, Douglas L., Elizabeth B. Lynch, and Karen O. Solomon (2000), “Are There Kinds of 
Concepts?,” Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 121–47. 
Medin, Douglas L. and Andrew Ortony (1989), “Psychological Essentialism,” in Similarity and 
Analogical Reasoning, ed. Stella Vosnaidou and Andrew Ortony, 179–95. 
Mergui, Peddy (2016), “Fruit by Nike,” http://www.peddymergui.com/portfolio/fruit-by-nike/. 
Meyers-Levy, Joan and Prashant Malaviya (1999), “Consumers’ Processing of Persuasive 
Advertisements: An Integrative Framework of Persuasion Theories,” Journal of 
Marketing, 63(4), 45–60. 
Miller, Henry I. and Gregory P. Conko (2004), The Frankenfood Myth: How Protest and Politics 
Threaten the Biotech Revolution, Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Moodie, Alison (2016), “GMO Food Labels Are Coming to More US Grocery Shelves – Are 
Consumers Ready?,” The Guardian, March 24, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2016/mar/24/gmo-food-labels-general-mills-kellog-mars. 
  
 
 
92 
Morales, Andrea C. and Gavan J. Fitzsimons (2007), “Product Contagion: Changing Consumer 
Evaluations through Physical Contact with Disgusting Products,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 44(2), 272–83. 
Morris, Michael W., Tanya Menon, and Daniel R. Ames (2001), “Culturally Conferred 
Conceptions of Agency: A Key to Social Perception of Persons, Groups, and Other 
Actors,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(2), 169–82. 
Muller, Dominique, Charles M. Judd, and Vincent Y. Yzerbyt (2005), “When Moderation Is 
Mediated and Mediation Is Moderated,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
89(6), 852–63. 
Murphy, Gregory L. and Douglas L. Medin (1985), “The Role of Theories in Conceptual 
Coherence.,” Psychological review, 92(3), 289. 
Nam, Myungwoo and Brian Sternthal (2008), “The Effects of a Different Category Context on 
Target Brand Evaluations,” Journal of Consumer Research, 35(4), 668–79. 
National Academies of Sciences (2016), Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and 
Prospects, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23395/genetically-engineered-crops-experiences-
and-prospects. 
Nemeroff, Carol J. and Paul Rozin (1994), “The Contagion Concept in Adult Thinking in the 
United States: Transmission of Germs and of Interpersonal Influence,” Ethos, 22(2), 158–
86. 
  
 
 
93 
——— (2000), “The Makings of the Magical Mind,” in Imagining the Impossible: Magical, 
Scientific, and Religious Thinking in Children, ed. Karl S. Rosengren, Carl N. Johnson, 
and Paul L. Harris, Cambridge University Press, 1–34. 
Newman, George E. and Paul Bloom (2014), “Physical Contact Influences How Much People 
Pay at Celebrity Auctions.,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 111(10), 3705–8. 
Newman, George E. and Ravi Dhar (2014), “Authenticity Is Contagious: Brand Essence and the 
Original Source of Production,” Journal of Marketing Research, 51(3), 371–86. 
Newman, George E., Gil Diesendruck, and Paul Bloom (2011), “Celebrity Contagion and the 
Value of Objects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 38(2), 215–28. 
Nicolia, Alessandro, Alberto Manzo, Fabio Veronesi, and Daniele Rosellini (2014), “An 
Overview of the Last 10 Years of Genetically Engineered Crop Safety Research.,” 
Critical Reviews in Biotechnology, 34(1), 77–88. 
Noseworthy, Theodore J., June Cotte, and Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee (2011), “The Effects of Ad 
Context and Gender on the Identification of Visually Incongruent Products,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 38(2), 358–75. 
Noseworthy, Theodore J., Kyle B. Murray, and Fabrizio Di Muro (2018), “When Two Wrongs 
Make a Right: Using Conjunctive Enablers to Enhance Evaluations for Extremely 
Incongruent New Products,” Journal of Consumer Research, 44(6), 1379–96. 
  
 
 
94 
Noseworthy, Theodore J. and Remi Trudel (2011), “Looks Interesting, but What Does It Do? 
Evaluation of Incongruent Product Form Depends on Positioning,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 48(6), 1008–19. 
Noseworthy, Theodore J., Juan Wang, and Towhidul Islam (2012), “How Context Shapes 
Category Inferences and Attribute Preference for New Ambiguous Products,” Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 22(4), 529–44. 
Olsen, Deborah (2014), “Say No to Natural on Food Labels,” 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/06/say-no-to-natural-on-food-
labels/index.htm. 
Onyango, Benjamin M., William K. Hallman, and Anne C. Bellows (2007), “Purchasing Organic 
Food in US Food Systems: A Study of Attitudes and Practice,” British Food Journal, 
109(5), 399–411. 
Painter, Kristen L. (2017), “Americans Are Eating More Organic Food than Ever, Survey Finds,” 
Star Tribune, May 24, http://www.startribune.com/424061513/. 
Qaim, Matin and Shahzad Kouser (2013), “Genetically Modified Crops and Food Security,” 
PLOS ONE, 8(6), e64879. 
Raghunathan, Rajagopal, Rebecca Walker Naylor, and Wayne D. Hoyer (2006), “The Unhealthy 
= Tasty Intuition and Its Effects on Taste Inferences, Enjoyment, and Choice of Food 
Products,” Journal of Marketing, 70(4), 170–84. 
  
 
 
95 
Rehder, Bob and ShinWoo Kim (2009), “Classification as Diagnostic Reasoning,” Memory & 
Cognition, 37(6), 715–29. 
Rips, Lance J (1989), “Similarity, Typicality, and Categorization,” in Similarity and Analogical 
Reasoning, ed. Stella Vosniadou and Andrew Ortony, Cambridge University Press, 21–
59. 
Roberts, Mary Lou and Lawrence H. Wortzel (1979), “New Life-Style Determinants of 
Women’s Food Shopping Behavior,” Journal of Marketing, 43(3), 28–39. 
Ross, Lee and Richard E. Nisbett (2011), The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social 
Psychology, Pinter & Martin Publishers. 
Rotman, David (2013), “Why We Will Need Genetically Modified Foods,” MIT Technology 
Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/522596/. 
Rozin, Paul (2006), “Naturalness Judgments by Lay Americans: Process Dominates Content in 
Judgments of Food or Water Acceptability and Naturalness,” Judgment and Decision 
Making, 1(2), 91–97. 
——— (2005), “The Meaning of Natural Process More Important than Content,” Psychological 
Science, 16(8), 652–58. 
Rozin, Paul and April E. Fallon (1987), “A Perspective on Disgust,” Psychological Review, 
94(1), 23–41. 
  
 
 
96 
Rozin, Paul, Claude Fischler, and Christy Shields-Argelès (2012), “European and American 
Perspectives on the Meaning of Natural,” Appetite, 59(2), 448–55. 
Rozin, Paul and Carol J. Nemeroff (1990), “The Laws of Sympathetic Magic: A Psychological 
Analysis of Similarity and Contagion,” in Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative 
Human Development, ed. James W. Stigler, Richard A. Schweder, and Gilbert Herdt, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rozin, Paul, Carol Nemeroff, Marcia Wane, and Amy Sherrod (1989), “Operation of the 
Sympathetic Magical Law of Contagion in Interpersonal Attitudes among Americans,” 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 27(4), 367–70. 
Rozin, Paul, Mark Spranca, Zeev Krieger, Ruth Neuhaus, Darlene Surillo, Amy Swerdlin, and 
Katherine Wood (2004), “Preference for Natural: Instrumental and Ideational/Moral 
Motivations, and the Contrast between Foods and Medicines.,” Appetite, 43(2), 147–54. 
Saletan, William (2015), “The Misleading War on GMOs: The Food Is Safe. The Rhetoric Is 
Dangerous.,” Slate Magazine, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_t
he_case_against_them_is_full_of_fraud_lies_and_errors.html. 
Scholderer, Joachim and Lynn J. Frewer (2003), “The Biotechnology Communication Paradox: 
Experimental Evidence and the Need for a New Strategy,” Journal of Consumer Policy, 
26(2), 125–57. 
  
 
 
97 
Scientific American (2013), “Labels for GMO Foods Are a Bad Idea,” Scientific American, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/labels-for-gmo-foods-are-a-bad-idea/. 
Scott, Sidney E., Yoel Inbar, and Paul Rozin (2016), “Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition 
to Genetically Modified Food in the United States,” Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 11(3), 315–324. 
Sheehan, Mark (2009), “Making Sense of the Immorality of Unnaturalness,” Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 18(2), 177–88. 
Sjöberg, Lennart (2000), “Perceived Risk and Tampering with Nature,” Journal of Risk 
Research, 3(4), 353–67. 
Slezak, Michael (2013), “Militant Filipino Farmers Destroy Golden Rice GM Crop,” New 
Scientist, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24021-militant-filipino-farmers-
destroy-golden-rice-gm-crop/. 
Smith, Edward E. and Douglas L. Medin (1981), “Categories and Concepts,” 
https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/categories-and-concepts. 
Smith, Rosanna K., George E. Newman, and Ravi Dhar (2015), “Closer to the Creator: Temporal 
Contagion Explains the Preference for Earlier Serial Numbers,” Journal of Consumer 
Research, 42(5), 653–68. 
Spranca, Mark (1992), “The Effect of Naturalness on Desirability and Preference in the Domain 
of Foods,” University of California, Berkeley. 
  
 
 
98 
Symmank, Claudia, Susann Zahn, and Harald Rohm (2018), “Visually Suboptimal Bananas: 
How Ripeness Affects Consumer Expectation and Perception,” Appetite, 120(Supplement 
C), 472–81. 
Takala, Tuija (2004), “The (Im)Morality of (Un)Naturalness,” Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, 13(1), 15–19. 
Talukdar, Debabrata and Charles Lindsey (2013), “To Buy or Not to Buy: Consumers’ Demand 
Response Patterns for Healthy Versus Unhealthy Food,” Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 
124–38. 
Tenbült, Petra, Nanne K. de Vries, Ellen Dreezens, and Carolien Martijn (2005), “Perceived 
Naturalness and Acceptance of Genetically Modified Food.,” Appetite, 45(1), 47–50. 
Tenzer, Andrew and Hanna Chalmers (2015), When Trust Falls Down. 
Tetlock, Philip E. (2002), “Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: Intuitive 
Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors.,” Psychological Review, 109(3), 451–71. 
Tetlock, Philip E., Orie V. Kristel, S. Beth, Melanie C. Green, and Jennifer S. Lerner (2000), 
“The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and 
Heretical Counterfactuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 853–70. 
The Economist (2013), “Into the Wildwood,” May 4, https://www.economist.com/news/science-
and-technology/21577033-gm-species-may-soon-be-liberated-deliberately-wildwood. 
  
 
 
99 
Thompson, Craig J. and Maura Troester (2002), “Consumer Value Systems in the Age of 
Postmodern Fragmentation: The Case of the Natural Health Microculture,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 28(4), 550–71. 
Tracey, Minnie B. (1949), “The Present Status of Frozen Food Marketing,” Journal of 
Marketing, 13(4), 470–80. 
Tversky, B. and K. Hemenway (1984), “Objects, Parts, and Categories.,” Journal of 
experimental psychology. General, 113(2), 169–97. 
Ulrich, Roger S. (1995), “Biophilia, Biophobia, and Natural Landscapes,” in The Biophilia 
Hypothesis, ed. Stephen R. Kellert and Edward O. Wilson, Island Press, 73–137. 
Vandersteen, Julius (2011), “Dyes Used to Enhance the Color of Fruits & Vegetables,” LEAFtv, 
https://www.leaf.tv/articles/dyes-used-to-enhance-the-color-of-fruits-vegetables/. 
Vermont (2014), “Act 120: An Act Relating to the Labeling of Food Produced with Genetic 
Engineering.,” http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2014/Acts/ACT120.pdf. 
Voss, Kevin E., Eric R. Spangenberg, and Bianca Grohmann (2003), “Measuring the Hedonic 
and Utilitarian Dimensions of Consumer Attitude,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
40(3), 310–20. 
Vucetich, John A., Jeremy T. Bruskotter, and Michael P. Nelson (2015), “Evaluating Whether 
Nature’s Intrinsic Value Is an Axiom of or Anathema to Conservation,” Conservation 
Biology, 29(2), 321–32. 
  
 
 
100 
Wansink, Brian and Pierre Chandon (2006), “Can ‘Low-Fat’ Nutrition Labels Lead to Obesity?,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 43(4), 605–17. 
Wilson, Edward O. (1984), Biophilia, Harvard University Press. 
Wossink, Ada and Zulal S. Denaux (2006), “Environmental and Cost Efficiency of Pesticide Use 
in Transgenic and Conventional Cotton Production,” Agricultural Systems, 90(1–3), 312–
28. 
Yue, Chengyan, Helen H. Jensen, Daren S. Mueller, Gail R. Nonnecke, Douglas Bonnet, and 
Mark L. Gleason (2007), “Estimating Consumers’ Valuation of Organic and 
Cosmetically Damaged Apples,” HortScience, 42(6), 1366–71. 
Zechendorf, Bernhard (1994), “What the Public Thinks about Biotechnology,” Nature 
Biotechnology, 12(9), 870–71, 873–75. 
Zlatevska, Natalina, Chris Dubelaar, and Stephen S. Holden (2014), “Sizing Up the Effect of 
Portion Size on Consumption: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Marketing, 78(3), 
140–54. 
 
  
  
 
 
101 
Appendix A: Study 1 Stimuli 
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Appendix B: Study 1 Additional Analyses 
 As previously mentioned, the Study 1 design combined cue (manmade vs. natural) and 
intent (present vs. absent) into a single four level variable given that these both converge to allow 
consumers to fully understand the product as being manmade or natural. However, from a 
substantive point of view, it may be considered useful to split the cue and a statement of intent 
into different independent variables, thus making it a 2 (Label: GM-labeled vs. AN-labeled) × 2 
(Positioning: manmade cue vs. natural cue) × 2 (Intent: present vs. absent) between-subjects 
factorial design. For the sake of comprehensiveness, I also conducted this analysis. 
A three-way ANOVA on purchase intent yielded an intuitive main effect of Label, such 
that purchase intent was higher for the AN-labeled product (M = 4.49) compared to the GM-
labeled product (M = 3.86; F(1, 343) = 20.62, p < .001). This main effect was qualified by a 
significant Label × Positioning interaction (F(1, 343) = 20.45, p < .001). In support of H1, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that purchase intent was higher for the GM-labeled product when 
it was viewed with a manmade cue (M = 4.13) than when it was viewed with a natural cue (M = 
3.59; F(1, 343) = 7.58, p < .01). Conversely, purchase intent was higher for the AN-labeled 
product when it was viewed with a natural cue (M = 4.85) than when it was viewed with a 
manmade cue (M = 4.13; F(1, 343) = 13.26, p < .001).  
The three-way interaction was not significant (p = .67). This seemingly supports the 
notion that a manmade cue can increase preference for a GM-labeled food even if intent is not 
conveyed. Although this could be interpreted as evidence that marketers may be able to utilize 
manmade cues in lieu of transparent statements, I would caution against this interpretation. 
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Closer examination revealed that preference for a GM-labeled food with a manmade cue only 
statistically differed from the natural cue when intent was present (MManmade Cue = 4.54 vs. MNatural 
Cue = 3.93; F(1, 343) = 4.81, p < .05). The effect fell to marginal when intent was absent 
(MManmade Cue = 3.72; MNatural Cue = 3.25; p = .09). 
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Appendix C: Study 2 Stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Manmade Cue Control 
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Appendix D: Study 2 “No Intent” Pilot 
This pilot study was conducted to test whether altering the physical appearance of a 
GMO would enhance preference for it in the absence of a statement of intent. Participants (N = 
80; 53.8% female; Mage = 35.93) were randomly assigned to a 2(Positioning: Natural Cue vs. 
Manmade Cue) between-subjects main effect design. The guise and instructions were identical to 
Study 2. Participants viewed an image of a pair of apples and consistent with Study 2, the apple 
on the left was always an ordinary red apple. In the Natural Cue (Manmade Cue) condition, the 
apple on the right was red (blue). I held the GMO label constant, thus the apple on the right was 
always a GMO. Purchase intent was captured using the same scale as in the manuscript: a three 
item, 7-point scale (“unlikely/likely,” “improbable/probable,” and “impossible/possible”; 
Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990). Results revealed that purchase intent for the blue GMO apple 
(M = 2.10) was significantly lower than the red GMO apple (M = 4.12; t(78) = 5.10, p < .001). 
Thus, consistent with our theorizing, the manmade cue did not enhance preference for a GMO 
when the statement of intent was not present. In fact, the manmade cue alone lowered preference 
for a GMO in this case, highlighting the conservative nature of this cue. 
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Appendix E: Study 3 Stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Energy Drink Aisle Produce Aisle 
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Appendix F: Study 3 “No Intent” Pilot 
This pilot study was conducted to test whether positioning a GMO amongst manmade 
products would enhance preference for it in the absence of a statement of intent. Participants (N 
= 80; 47.5% female; Mage = 33.0) were randomly assigned to a 2(Positioning: Natural Cue vs. 
Manmade Cue) between-subjects main effect design. The products, procedures, stimuli, and 
guise were identical to Study 3. The only difference was that the target product stimuli (General 
Mills’ APEX cereal) had the statement of intent removed and was a GMO across both 
conditions. Purchase intent for the target product was captured using the same scale as in the 
study (and stated above in the Study 2 “No Intent” Pilot). Consistent with my theorizing, the 
manmade cue did not enhance preference for the GMO cereal when it was not accompanied by a 
statement of intent (MManmade Cue = 2.50, MNatural Cue = 2.70; p = .57). 
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Appendix G: Study 4 Pilot Study 
Method 
Participants and design. Three hundred and seventy-four consumers (54.3% female; Mage 
= 35.5) were recruited from MTurk. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (Label: GMO vs. Naturally Grown) × 2 (Order: Manmade Cue First vs. Label 
First) between-subjects factorial design. 
 
Stimuli. The stimuli adopted for this pilot study was a photograph of the exact product 
that was used in the field experiment (see Appendix H). 
 
Procedures and dependent measures. This study adopted the cover story that a company 
is launching a new plum product and was interested in consumers’ opinions of the product. 
Following the cover story, participants in the Manmade Cue First condition viewed an image of 
the product then read a brief description of the product. Conversely, participants in the Label 
First condition read a brief description of the product then viewed an image of the product. 
Embedded in the product description was the Label manipulation, which entailed the explicit 
statement that the product was either grown naturally or genetically modified to contain a high 
concentration of vitamins and minerals. Then, purchase intent, moral opposition, utilitarian 
benefits, and perceived naturalness were captured using the same items outlined in Study 3. The 
survey concluded with basic demographic questions. 
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Results 
Purchase intent. A two-way ANOVA on purchase intent (α = .94) yielded a main effect 
of Label such that participants were more likely to purchase the GMO plum (M = 3.06) than the 
naturally grown plum (M = 2.71; F(1, 370) = 4.32, p < .05, η2 = .01). Critically, this was 
qualified by a Label × Product Cue interaction (F(1, 370) = 5.85, p < .05, η2 = .02). As predicted, 
simple effects revealed that participants were more likely to purchase the GMO plum when the 
manmade cue was presented before the GMO label (M = 3.33) compared to when the GMO label 
was presented before the manmade cue (M = 2.81; F(1, 370) = 4.21, p < .05, η2 = .01). Purchase 
intent for the natural plum did not differ between the Manmade Cue First condition (M = 2.53) 
and the Label First condition (M = 2.87; p = .18). 
 
Moral opposition. A two-way ANOVA on moral opposition (r = .89) yielded a main 
effect of Label such that participants were more morally opposed to the GMO plum (M = 2.78) 
than the naturally grown plum (M = 2.45; F(1, 370) = 3.53, p = .06, η2 = .01). Critically, this was 
qualified by a Label × Product Cue interaction (F(1, 370) = 6.31, p < .05, η2 = .02). Simple 
effects revealed that participants were less morally opposed to the GMO plum when the 
manmade cue was presented before the GMO label (M = 2.52) compared to when the GMO label 
was presented before the manmade cue (M = 3.01; F(1, 370) = 4.15, p < .05, η2 = .01). Moral 
opposition to the natural plum did not differ between the manmade cue first condition (M = 2.63) 
and the label first condition (M = 2.28; p = .13). 
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Utilitarian benefits. A two-way ANOVA on utilitarian benefits (α = .91) yielded a main 
effect of Label such that participants perceived greater utilitarian benefits for the GMO plum (M 
= 3.81) than the naturally grown plum (M = 3.55; F(1, 370) = 4.00, p < .05, η2 = .01). Unlike 
Study 3, the results did not indicate that utilitarian benefits were higher for the natural product. 
This may have occurred because the product was presented with a manmade cue and a statement 
of intent in all conditions, potentially reducing the perceived utilitarian benefits of the natural 
product. Critically, this was qualified by a Label × Product Cue interaction (F(1, 370) = 5.59, p < 
.05, η2 = .01). Simple effects revealed that participants perceived the GMO plum to have greater 
utilitarian benefits when the manmade cue was presented before the GMO label (M = 4.00) 
compared to when the GMO label was presented before the manmade cue (M = 3.63; F(1, 370) = 
3.68, p = .06, η2 = .01). Perceived utilitarian benefits of the natural plum did not differ between 
the manmade cue first condition (M = 3.41) and the label first condition (M = 3.68; p = .16).  
To determine whether a decrease in moral opposition enhanced the GMO’s perceived 
utilitarian benefits, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted (Hayes 2013; Model 8; 
bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). As predicted, the results revealed a significant conditional 
indirect effect of Order on utilitarian benefits through moral opposition when the cereal 
contained genetically modified corn (95% CI: .008; .37) but not when it contained corn that was 
naturally grown (95% CI: −.31; .03). To conduct a test of H3, a conditional serial mediation 
analysis was conducted (Hayes 2012; Model 6 split on Label; bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). 
As predicted, looking exclusively at the participants who viewed the GMO plum, the results 
revealed that moral opposition and perceived utilitarian benefits serially mediated the effect of 
Order on purchase intent (95% CI: .01; .43). Additional analyses indicated that the model was 
  
 
 
111 
nonsignificant when the order of the mediators was reversed (95% CI: −.10; .004). Conversely, 
when looking at participants who viewed the naturally grown plum, moral judgments and 
perceived utilitarian benefits did not serially mediate the effect of Order on purchase intent (95% 
CI: −.26; .02). 
Confound check: Perceived naturalness. A two-way ANOVA on perceived naturalness 
once again revealed the expected main effect of Label, such that participants perceived the GMO 
plum to less natural (M = 43.63) than the naturally grown plum (M = 52.37; F(1, 369) = 7.98, p 
< .01, η2 = .02). There was also a main effect of Order such that participants perceived the plum 
to be less natural when they read the product description first (M = 44.77) than when they 
viewed the product first (M = 51.65; F(1, 369) = 4.88, p < .05, η2 = .01). The Label × Order 
interaction was not significant (p = .82).  
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Appendix H: Study 4 Stimuli 
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Appendix I: Study 4 “No Intent” Pilot 
This pilot study was conducted to test whether presenting a manmade cue before the 
GMO label would enhance preference for the GMO in the absence of a statement of intent. 
Participants (N = 80; 55.0% female; Mage = 35.96) were randomly assigned to a 2(Order: 
Manmade Cue First vs. Label First) between-subjects main effect design. The procedure, stimuli, 
and guise were identical to Study 4. The only difference from the field study being that the target 
product was presented as an image and the GMO label was presented textually (as opposed to 
verbally). Purchase intent for the target product was captured using the same scale as in the study 
(and the other “No Intent” pilots). Consistent with my theorizing, viewing the manmade cue 
before the GMO label did not enhance preference for the GMO when it was not accompanied by 
a statement of intent (MManmade Cue First = 2.76, MLabel First = 2.73; p = .94).   
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Appendix J: Additional Study 
 The primary goal of this study was to explore the question of whether GMOs are more 
acceptable as ingredients in manmade products as opposed to being sold as whole entities (e.g., 
apples). Although the previous studies demonstrated the effect of a manmade cue on the 
acceptance of a GM-labeled food for whole entities (e.g., apples in Study 2) and foods with GM 
ingredients (e.g., cereal in Study 3), the relative strength of the manmade cue for each of these 
kinds of products had not been tested in a single study. One possibility was that a GMO would 
be more acceptable as an ingredient because the product it is included in is ultimately manmade. 
Conversely, I predicted that a GMO positioned as being manmade would be equally acceptable 
as an ingredient and as a whole entity based on the notion that people ultimately reason about the 
GMO regardless of its form. Indeed, consumers appear to dislike GMOs both as whole entities 
and ingredients (Chassy and Jon Entine 2015; Frewer et al. 1996). This prediction was also 
consistent with the results of Study 3, which showed that even when a GMO is used as an 
ingredient in a manmade product (e.g., cereal), consumers still think about the modified 
ingredient itself (e.g., oats) in terms of being natural. Specifically, in Study 3, consumers 
exhibited a substantial drop in preference for the cereal containing a GMO when it was 
positioned amongst natural products. This suggested that the product was evaluated negatively 
because participants were reasoning about the oats as though they were natural despite having 
been incorporated into a manmade product. Thus, if consumers are equally averse to genetically 
modified ingredients and whole entities, then the Label × Positioning × Product interaction 
should not be significant. However, if the established effect of positioning a GM-labeled food as 
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manmade replicates, the Label × Positioning interaction (for the full design, not broken out by 
Product) should be significant. 
Similar to Study 3, I sought to adopt an indirect means of cuing consumers to reason 
about the product as either natural or manmade. Prior work has demonstrated that adjacent 
products can influence how consumers process a target (Meyers-Levy and Malaviya 1999; Nam 
and Sternthal 2008; Noseworthy, Cotte, and Lee 2011). For example, researchers have shown 
that viewing ads for similar products (as opposed to unrelated products) can lead consumers to 
see a new product as more closely resembling the products in the adjacent ads (Noseworthy et al. 
2011). This suggested that viewing consecutive natural (manmade) products might increase the 
likelihood that a subsequent product would be evaluated as though it is natural (manmade). 
Therefore, if a product’s positioning indeed serves as a cue for how it should be understood and 
evaluated, then it was expected that similar effects as in Studies 1 and 2 would again emerge 
without manipulating the product itself.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Consumers (N = 316; 54.7% female; Mage = 37.2) were recruited 
from MTurk and randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (Label: GM-labeled vs. 
AN-labeled) × 2 (Positioning: Manmade Cue vs. Natural Cue) × 2 (Product: Corn vs. Corn 
Flakes) between-subjects factorial design. The goal was to manipulate whether the target product 
was positioned amongst either natural or manmade objects. Thus, the stimuli consisted of two 
sets of two products that were either manmade (bike lock, fan) or natural (flowers, carrots; see 
Appendix K).  
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Pretest 
Participants from MTurk (N = 79; 49.4% female; Mage = 40.2) were randomly assigned to 
view either a manmade product (i.e., a fan or a bike lock) or a natural product (i.e., carrots or 
flowers) and subsequently rate it using the same pretest items as in Study 1. As anticipated, those 
who viewed a manmade product reported that it was indeed more comparable to a manmade 
object (M = 8.72) than to a natural object (M = 1.15; F(1, 77) = 304.88, p < .001). Conversely, 
those who viewed a natural product reported that it was more comparable to a natural object (M 
= 7.25) than to a manmade object (M = 3.73; F(1, 77) = 67.91, p < .001). Thus, this manipulation 
was adopted as a means of cueing participants to reason about the target product as if it were 
either a manmade or natural product. 
 
Procedures and dependent measures. Participants were first presented with the cover 
story that the study was commissioned by a large American retailer. They were told that they 
would be viewing several products and would then be randomly asked questions about one of the 
products (a guise). Participants then viewed either two manmade products or two natural 
products. The products were conveyed independently and in randomized order. The third product 
in both series was either Harvest Bounty corn flakes breakfast cereal or Harvest Bounty corn. In 
the naturally grown condition, it was stated that the corn had been grown using natural farming 
practices. Conversely, in the GMO condition it was stated that the corn was developed using 
gene splicing technology. All participants read that the corn consequently contains more vitamin 
B6 and produces high yields without needing fertilizer. After participants viewed the final 
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product, they filled out an electronic questionnaire that consisted of the same purchase intent, 
moral opposition, and utilitarian benefits as in Study 3. The survey concluded with basic 
demographic questions. 
 
Results 
Purchase intent. A three-way ANOVA on purchase intent (α = .96) yielded a marginally 
significant Label × Positioning × Product interaction (F(1, 308) = 3.31, p = .07, η2 = .01). 
Subsequent analyses revealed that the Label × Positioning interaction was not significant for 
either the corn (p = .32) or the breakfast cereal (p = .12).  Finally, the Label × Positioning for the 
full design was not significant (p = .70). 
 
Moral opposition. A three-way ANOVA on moral opposition (r = .94) yielded a 
significant Label × Positioning × Product interaction (F(1, 308) = 7.16, p < .01, η2 = .02). The 
nature of the interaction was such that when the product was breakfast cereal, there was a 
significant Label × Positioning interaction (F(1, 308) = 5.58, p < .05, η2 = .01). Consistent with 
Study 3, simple effects revealed that participants were less morally opposed to the GM-labeled 
cereal when it was positioned amongst manmade products (M = 2.21) compared to natural 
products (M = 3.23; F(1, 308) = 12.59, p < .001, η2 = .04). Also in line with Study 3, moral 
opposition toward the AN-labeled cereal was not impacted by Positioning (MManmade Cue = 1.35; 
MNatural Cue = 1.41, p = .83). When the product was corn, the Label × Positioning interaction was 
not significant (p = .16). Finally, the Label × Positioning for the full design was not significant (p 
= .51). 
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Utilitarian benefits. A three-way ANOVA on utilitarian benefits (α = .91) yielded a 
significant Label × Positioning × Product interaction (F(1, 308) = 6.58, p < .05, η2 = .02). The 
nature of the interaction was such that when the product was breakfast cereal, there was a 
significant Label × Positioning interaction (F(1, 308) = 5.89, p < .05, η2 = .01). As predicted, 
simple effects revealed that participants perceived greater utilitarian benefits when the GM-
labeled cereal was positioned amongst manmade products (M = 4.67) compared to natural 
products (M = 3.74; F(1, 308) = 16.96, p < .001, η2 = .04). Utilitarian benefits for the AN-labeled 
cereal was not impacted by Positioning (MManmade Cue = 5.32; MNatural Cue = 5.25, p = .76). When 
the product was corn, the Label × Positioning interaction was not significant (p = .23). Finally, 
the Label × Positioning for the full design was not significant (p = .39). 
To determine whether a decrease in moral opposition allowed consumers to perceive the 
GMO cereal’s utilitarian benefits, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted (Hayes 2013; 
Model 8; bootstrapped with 20,000 draws). As predicted, the results revealed a significant 
conditional indirect effect of Positioning on utilitarian benefits through moral opposition when 
the cereal contained genetically modified corn (95% CI: .11; 1.00) but not when it contained 
corn that was naturally grown (95% CI: −.15; .21). 
 
Confound Check: Perceived naturalness. As expected, a three-way ANOVA on 
perceived naturalness yielded a significant main effect of Label such that the GM-labeled 
product was perceived to be less natural (M = 50.13) than the AN-labeled product (M = 77.06; 
F(1, 308) = 99.38, p < .001, η2 = .24; see Table 4). There was also a significant main effect of 
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Product such that the breakfast cereal was perceived to be less natural (M = 60.88) than the corn 
on the cob (M = 66.69; F(1, 308) = 4.45, p < .05, η2 = .01). No other effects, including the 
Positioning × Label interaction within the cereal condition, were significant (ps > .14). 
 
 
Discussion 
Although these results did not entirely conform to my predictions, they were informative 
in a number of ways. First, the two-way results for the corn product suggest that merely 
Table 4: Treatment Means and Cell Counts for Additional Study 
 
 Corn Cereal 
 GM-Labeled AN-Labeled GM-Labeled AN-Labeled 
 Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
Natural 
Cue 
Manmade 
Cue 
 
Purchase Intent 04.58 
(01.84) 
04.26 
(01.94) 
05.36 
(01.25) 
05.60 
(01.40) 
02.96 
(01.70) 
03.38 
(01.90) 
04.58 
(01.62) 
04.14 
(02.00) 
Moral 
Opposition 
2.26 
(01.37) 
2.48 
(01.43) 
1.75 
(01.06) 
1.39 
(00.94) 
3.23a 
(02.10) 
2.01a 
(01.46) 
1.41 
(00.92) 
1.35 
(00.71) 
Utilitarian 
Benefits 
5.06 
(01.10) 
4.85 
(01.89) 
5.49 
(0.93) 
5.71 
(01.00) 
3.74b 
(01.40) 
4.67b 
(01.20) 
5.25 
(0.88) 
5.32 
(01.06) 
Naturalness  56.46 
(30.42) 
50.75 
(26.26) 
80.00 
(17.62) 
78.78 
(21.99) 
42.23 
(28.69) 
51.59 
(28.83) 
74.98 
(14.76) 
74.50 
(20.70) 
Cell Size 37 40 40 40 40 39 40 40 
 
Note—Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Means with matching superscripts represent simple effects 
of at least p < .05.  
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positioning a GM-labeled food amongst manmade products in an advertising context may be 
insufficient to overcome the moral opposition to genetic modification when the product still 
looks like a natural entity.4 Indeed, research suggests that the surface level properties of natural 
objects are particularly strong cues of that object’s category membership (Hampton et al. 2009). 
Thus, it is not surprising that the physical form of the natural object would serve as a more 
prominent cue that it is natural compared to adjacent advertisements (which are a relatively 
subtle cue) suggesting that it is manmade. Although one should be cautious about interpreting a 
null effect, there does seem to be a theoretical explanation for why ad context did not alter 
consumers’ response to the GM corn. In hindsight, it seems that designing the study this way was 
too conservative and biased too strongly against the predicted effect of ad context. A better 
approach may have been to adopt a more controlled means of altering the product category. 
Given the strength of a natural object’s physical form in categorization, perhaps it would be best 
not to display the target products at all. Instead, the ad copy could merely describe the products 
as either corn flakes or corn on the cobb, offering a cleaner product category manipulation.   
Second, when the product was breakfast cereal, the established effect for two out of three 
dependent variables (moral opposition and utilitarian benefits) emerged as predicted. 
                                                
 
 
4 Subsequent analyses confirmed that there was a significant main effect of Label on moral 
opposition for the GM-labeled corn such that participants were more morally opposed to the 
GM-labeled corn (M = 2.37) compared to the AN-labeled corn (M = 1.57; F(1, 153) = 19.39, p < 
.001). Thus, it seems that moral opposition indeed activated in response to genetic modification, 
but the manmade cue was insufficient to circumvent this. 
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Specifically, positioning the GM-labeled cereal amongst manmade products reduced moral 
opposition, and this led to an increase in perceived utilitarian benefits. However, it is unclear 
why this did not translate into purchase intentions, as it did in the other studies. In the end, these 
results could simply be due to statistical variation and/or noise. Another possibility is that while 
prior work has typically presented participants with three advertisements as part of the 
manipulation (Noseworthy et al. 2011, 2012), this study only presented participants with two 
advertisements. Thus, it is possible that increasing the strength of the positioning manipulation 
by adding additional advertisements would have enhanced the downstream effects. Another way 
to strengthen this manipulation could be to explicitly state that the group of products have been 
bundled together. This could increase the extent to which the preceding advertisements influence 
how participants reason about the target ad.  
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Appendix K: Additional Study Stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manmade Cue Natural Cue 
